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Question 
What evidence is there for resilience approaches in fragile, conflict-affected contexts, and 
protracted crises? Specifically: 
 What evidence that delivery of resilience-protecting and resilience-building programming 
is feasible in these contexts, and under what conditions? 
 What evidence about the impact of resilience programming in these contexts, on 
individuals, households, institutions, countries, and systems? 
 What does the available evidence suggest on the effectiveness of single-sector deep 
approaches versus integrated multi-sector approaches?  
 What does the available evidence state about resilience programming in Syria 
specifically? 
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1. Summary  
This rapid literature review explores lessons on resilience programming in fragile and conflict-
affected states (FCAS) and protracted crises. Resilience programming has shown to be effective 
in helping recipients respond to previous shocks. There is less evidence that it can enable 
recipients to build resilience to future shocks because of both the time needed to judge this, and 
the nature of many FCAS or protracted crises means it is not always possible to build sufficient 
resilience to large shocks. It is widely argued that because resilience is a complex phenomenon, 
resilience programming should seek to be holistic in addressing different facets of a single 
sector, and linking with other sectors. Evidence from surveys of populations' survival strategies 
supports this. Most evaluations stress the importance of such programming, either undertaken by 
individual donors/NGOs, or achieved through co-operation between donors and, where possible, 
local governance. There is limited evidence on the impact of resilience programmes in Syria. 
However, several surveys of Syrians' resilience strategies provide strong evidence on the likely 
feasibility of resilience programmes in the country. 
For the purpose of this review, resilience is defined as the ability of individuals, households, 
communities, countries, and systems to absorb, adapt to, anticipate, and recover from shocks 
and stresses (Sturgess & Sparrey, 2016; Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2020, 
forthcoming). In the Syrian context, and other conflict-affected and protracted crises, resilience 
approaches can include resilience-protecting and resilience-building objectives, and can be 
framed in relation to both past and future shocks and stresses. Resilience programming therefore 
begins by asking resilience of what, to what, with analysis of resilience capacity within particular 
social groups or institutions, and of the shocks and stresses in that environment. It is often 
divided into absorptive, anticipatory, adaptive and transformative resilience, or a similar 
formulation (Sturgess & Sparrey, 2016). 
Resilience is a broad concept applied in many different ways, and therefore the evidence base 
has some gaps. There is currently less research on resilience programming in conflict situations, 
partly because of a focus on environmental and economic stressors until recently, as well as the 
difficulty of implementing more development-oriented programmes in conflict situations (Maxwell 
et al., 2017; Twigg, 2015; Twigg, J., & Calderone, M., 2019; Herbert, Haider, Lenhardt & 
Maguire, 2020, forthcoming). Resilience can take a number of forms in programming, from 
providing support in diversifying livelihoods, food security, agricultural support, support for 
markets, accumulating or protecting assets, the development of community safety nets, 
infrastructure, early warning systems, credit, migration, community dispute resolution, peace 
forums, or the development of formal local and national governance institutions (Sturgess & 
Sparrey, 2016). Resilience has typically been used in specific sectors and there is less evidence 
for more holistic forms of resilience building that seek to build peace, for example Herbert, 
Haider, Lenhardt & Maguire, 2020, forthcoming).  
The main criticisms of resilience are (Stites & Bushby, 2017, p. 6) that it misses the role of power 
and politics in determining vulnerability, as well as internal sources of vulnerability; it places the 
onus for strength or recovery primarily on the individual (or household or community) while 
overlooking inherent and structural conditions; it is too vague to allow for effective programme or 
policy design; it detracts attention and funds away from needed forms of support, including 
conditions in which emergency assistance is inevitable. These broad criticisms do not apply to all 
types of resilience programming and are much more relevant for single sector approaches than 
to integrated/holistic approaches.  
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While definitions of fragile states differ, common features are the state's loss of physical control 
of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to 
make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; and the inability to 
interact with other states as a full member of the international community.1 Protracted crises are 
'when a significant proportion of the population is vulnerable to death, disease or disruption of 
their livelihoods over a long period of time', often featuring natural hazards and conflict.2  
 
In FCAS, or protracted crises, a number of difficulties arise. These include: 
 Breakdown in governance and resulting difficulty in institutionalising changes 
programmes seek to make through local or national government 
 Increased number and magnitude of macro-level shocks (e.g. inflation, food shortages) 
 Greater disruption to production, markets and livelihoods systems needed to sustain 
resilience 
 Security problems (e.g. conflict, extortion) either in communities or at a regional/national 
level 
 Increased informal governance (e.g. through religious leaders, or armed groups) 
 More impact on particular groups (e.g. people with disabilities, certain ethnic groups) 
Resilience programmes in these settings run the risk of exacerbating conflict. If not sufficiently 
conflict-sensitive, they can worsen inequalities within or between communities, and thereby 
contribute to local conflicts. Resources provided by programmes can become the target of theft 
or violence by armed groups (Peters et al., 2020). 
This review has focused on programmes explicitly packaged as 'resilience' work or featuring a 
significant resilience component. While there is much development work that could be 
considered resilience building, this review has not usually considered such programmes. The 
report surveys evaluations and academic papers on resilience in FCAS. It focuses on discussion 
of feasibility (e.g. how to frame programming, engage with local actors etc.) and impact. The 
report is divided geographically. Section 6 focuses on evidence from Syria. Evidence is taken 
both from programme evaluations and reports, and from analyses of community resilience 
strategies that can be used to inform programmes. Analyses of community resilience are used to 
show how NGO programmes may be able to build on existing sources of resilience. While there 
is relatively little evidence of the impact of resilience programmes in Syria, there are several 
analyses of local resilience capacity within the country that can inform programming (e.g. Stein, 
2020). All evaluations mention the importance of targeting programmes to vulnerable groups. 
This includes programming focused on women and gender-sensitive programming. There is also 
some mention of people with disabilities as a vulnerable group. However, several reports note 
that some of the extant resilient institutions in FCAS, or donor-supported ones, favour certain 
sectors of the population (e.g. the well-connected). 
                                                   
1 https://fragilestatesindex.org/frequently-asked-questions/what-does-state-fragility-mean/ 
2 http://www.fao.org/in-action/kore/protracted-crises-and-conflicts/en/ 
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Feasibility 
Evidence on feasibility considers the way that resilience is framed, understood and measured; 
the way that programming is implemented; and the barriers and opportunities in given contexts. 
Evaluations and academic literature are used to show the lessons on the feasibility of 
programming.  
Conceptual clarity is linked to feasibility. Programming needs to be linked to a plausible 
analysis of the situation, and good coordination among relevant actors. For example, 
Cusumano and Hofmaier (2020) argue that in authoritarian states, resilience of society is 
contradictory to resilience of state institutions. They show how interventions in Mali focused on 
supporting the armed forces are therefore ineffective at building resilience as they do not address 
all the factors, and call for more coordination and make sure one form of resilience does not 
contradict another. Some argue that a resilience framing of some problems is misguided and 
unfeasible. In one example, by focusing on the resilience of civilians to attacks by armed actors, 
and not addressing the problem of the attacks (Shah, 2015), programmes are said to have 
focused on bolstering absorptive capacity instead of seeking to transform stressors. Framing 
resilience also an attribute of a particular segment of society can also be counterproductive. 
Kaya (2018) notes that in Iraq, too heavy an emphasis on the 'community' and 'cultural factors' 
as sources of vulnerability and resilience came at the expense of considering legal and political 
barriers and opportunities. 
Undertaking resilience work in FCAS requires the willingness to engage in a conflict zone, 
and to adapt working criteria and methods of engagement. For example, the World Bank 
had to adapt its funding mechanisms to work in Yemen during the conflict (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 
2018). All reports agree on the importance of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity (e.g. 
Maxwell, D., Stites, E., Robillard, S. C., & Wagner, M., 2017; Bond, 2017; Boresha 2020). This 
can provide early warning for conflict shocks, analysis of how aid may make recipients a target, 
or play into war economies, and how aid can help reduce tensions. Conflict sensitivity can be 
practised by using local staff loyal to the programme (rather than local groups involved in a 
conflict), with good mediation skills, or local partners (Boresha, 2020; Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; 
Singh and Brandolini, 2019; Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). The added importance of 
demonstrating neutrality to all recipients and partners in a conflict zone is widely agreed on (Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018; Morais and Ahmed, 2010). 
Resilience work in FCAS should be realistic about what can be achieved. Because of the 
complexity of conflict, natural disasters and other shocks in FCAS,  'interventions to build 
resilience are not a quick fix but rather require extensive commitments in time, planning and 
follow-up' (Stites and Bushby, 2017). Small-scale conflict resolution work around natural 
resources is possible, although there is a limited evidence base (e.g. Twigg, 2015; Mena and 
Hilhorst, 2020; USAID, 2020). Resilience to past shocks is more likely to be feasible than 
resilience to future shocks in a FCAS. There is less likely to be a linear progression from less to 
more resilient beyond a certain point, as continued shocks from conflict situation or macro-
economic environment are possible (Ward and Qatinah, 2019; Shah, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2015). 
Moreover, flexible funding to respond to shocks, changed circumstances, and to switch between 
'emergency' and 'development' or 'reconstruction' funds if needed. In some particularly fragile 
contexts, a focus on absorptive resilience may be realistic (Mena and Hilhorst, 2020; Pickwick, 
2020; Twigg and Calderone, 2019; Care, 2020). It is important to 'sequence, layer and target' 
interventions to help the most needy onto 'resilience pathways'. Interventions should be carefully 
targeted to specific income or occupation groups (SomRep, 2018). 
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Resilience programming should be framed based on evidence of local coping strategies 
and resilience structures, rather than pre-determined political priorities. For example, EU 
work in East Africa and the Sahel prioritised preventing migration, but evidence shows that 
migration is an important resilience strategy (European Commission, 2017). Linked to this, the 
evidence shows the importance of specific knowledge of existing livelihoods and resilience 
strategies and barriers in a given context in order to appropriately target responses. Social 
networks, social capital and trust are important sources of resilience, and are not always 
immediately visible (Twigg and Calderone, 2019). Programmes should therefore seek to build 
these up, as well as to be aware that they can lead to increased resilience for the better 
connected. 
Resilience often requires co-operation with many local actors, from civil society, the 
private sector, and local and national government. In FCAS, such co-operation is sometimes 
difficult to achieve for a number of reasons, so programmes should carefully consider how best 
to achieve this. A European Commission (2017) evaluation emphasises the importance of 
working with government where possible or NGOs elsewhere in order to provide broad service 
provision and sustainable programmes, and to make use of existing capacity (see also Al-
Ahmadi & de Silva, 2018). It is possible to engage with the governments of FCAS in many cases. 
The FCAS 'category includes a broad spectrum of conditions – from states with relatively robust 
systems but political or regime instability, to states with extreme limits on sovereignty or capacity. 
Rarely, however, can a fragile state do nothing. Indeed, the very malleability of state institutions 
in periods of instability can be viewed as an opportunity – rather than necessarily a risk – for 
positive external influence' (Taylor, 2014). 
Impact  
Due to the long-term and complex nature of resilience, there are gaps in the available 
evidence of impact. There is considerable evidence on the impact of programming on resilience 
to past shocks. However, there is less on resilience to future shocks. Some evaluations have 
also drawn preliminary lessons from on-going or recent programmes, which have also been 
included.  
In FCAS, evaluations stress the importance of understanding the cyclical nature of 
shocks. Cash transfers or food aid may improve resilience among recipients, allowing them to 
pay off debts or focus on livelihoods, but this should not necessarily be seen as 'progress' or 
sustainable resilience because another shock could leave them in need again (e.g. SomRep, 
2018; Cash Alliance, 2018; Bonilla et al, 2017). In fragile contexts, there is therefore stronger 
evidence on programmes improving resilience to past events than building resilience for the 
future. The latter is seen as harder to measure (given that time needs to pass), and harder to 
implement given the number of potential shocks in a fragile context (European Commission, 
2017). 
Measurements of impact on resilience to future shocks are sometimes imperfect. For 
example, the EU does not have a tool and the measures it uses in some programmes (e.g. food 
security measures) 'fall short of understanding the extent to which the capacity for withstanding 
future crises has increased'. 
The nature of FCAS can sometimes skew programming priorities. There was some 
evidence that resilience work in conflict-affected areas is not needs-based (i.e. stays away from 
conflict, or works only in government-controlled areas) (Mena and Hilhorst, 2019; Tranchant et 
6 
al., 2019). Some note a possible contradiction between targeting the most vulnerable and 
resilience outcomes, as those able to contribute to increased economic activity, for example, are 
less likely to be vulnerable (EU, 2019, p. 12). Many effective mechanisms for increasing 
resilience, such as voluntary loan and savings associations, often attract the comparatively better 
off (SomRep, 2018; D’Errico, Ngesa, & Pietrelli, 2020). 
There are lessons from different programming modalities. Cash transfers are widely seen as 
effective and favoured by recipients. They have been shown to enable recipients to pay debts, 
reduce expenditure on food, and participate in local markets more. They can also overcome 
problems such as theft, and enable more accurate targeting (e.g. Stites, E., & Bushby, K., 2017; 
D’Errico, M., Ngesa, O., & Pietrelli, R., 2020; Cash Alliance, 2018; Morais and Ahmed, 2010; 
Bonilla et al, 2017). In addition to increasing resilience to disasters, some authors argue that 
DRR can be effective building resilience to low-level conflict, although evidence is limited. 
However, conflict can also restrict DRR work - in contexts with national conflict, more DRR 
projects are undertaken in government-held areas (e.g. Peters, et al., 2020; Twigg, 2015; Mena 
and Hilhorst, 2020; USAID, 2020). Voluntary savings and loans (VSLAs) in Somalia built social 
capital, self-esteem and empowerment, and helped share ideas and expertise. VSLAs and NGO 
efforts to strengthen governance were also found to be important - e.g. committees for disasters 
(SomRep, 2018). Working through local customs, such as informal loan systems among 
pastoralists, can be effective, although inclusion criteria should be carefully considered (Bevins, 
2019; Iyer, 2019; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015). 
Single-sector deep approaches versus integrated multi-sector approaches 
It is widely argued that resilience is complex and that therefore programming needs to 
address multiple facets. All agree that vulnerability is the result of complex interactions of 
shocks and stresses in FCAS, and that resilience programming should seek to address this 
(Peters et al., 2020). Both the vertical integration of single sectors, and multi-sector 
integration/co-ordination, are widely asserted to be necessary for effective resilience, particularly 
to create transformative resilience. Many evaluations report that co-ordination between different 
sectors can be effective in realising the benefits of resilience work.  
For example, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) summarises its approach to 
resilience: 'Resilience is multi-dimensional and cross-sectoral, reflecting the range of livelihood 
dimensions and coping strategies of households and communities, as well as the concurrent 
requirements, standards and policies that need to be put in place by local, national and global 
institutions to ensure the protection and progression of development gains. Agencies working on 
resilience recognise that their efforts need to be strongly underpinned by collaboration and 
partnerships with a range of other actors and partners' (FAO, 2016, p. 52). Mercy Corps (Howe 
et al., 2018) on Syrian resilience adapted their livelihoods through seven years of conflict 
recommends that donors and NGOs research the 'system-wide impact of interventions to 
understand effects beyond those involving direct beneficiaries and after the end of programme 
activities' (p. 45). Many agencies advocate for linking livelihoods, food or other forms of resilience 
with resilience from conflict. The FAO argues that 'a sustainable impact on peace is more likely 
when food security and livelihood-related initiatives are implemented as part of a broader set of 
multisectoral, humanitarian, developmental and peace-related interventions' (FAO, 2018, p. 57). 
Holistic interventions can be achieved through complementary partnerships as well as 
multi-sector programming. For example, an EU report argues that resilience is multi-sectorial, 
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but programming need not be as long as it can effectively complement other programming or 
state work (European Commission, 2017). A report on World Bank programmes in Yemen 
suggested interventions in one sector should be 'tightly linked' to other sectors in order to ensure 
all facets of resilience can be improved and can reinforce each other (Al-Ahmadi & de Silva, 
2018). An evaluation of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) work in 
Syria emphasises that the donor should support livelihoods in a strategic way, built on a nuanced 
understanding of context and partners, and include clearly articulated intended outcomes (DFAT, 
2019). Some recommend working in line with security forces in conflict situations, given the 
potential for violent conflict to cause shocks and disrupt resilience in other sectors (Mercy Corps, 
2015). Cash support can have a multi-sectoral effect, by allowing households to respond 
effectively to a wide variety of shocks and needs in different sectors (Bonilla et al., 2017). 
Evidence on Syria 
There are several studies of existing resilience in Syrian society and institutions, from 
which programming lessons can be drawn. They show that there are multiple sources of 
shocks in the context, as well as damage to pre-war systems of agriculture and food security, 
social capital, livelihoods security and health systems. 
A number of resilience-supporting factors have been negatively affected by the conflict. 
Evidence on conditions hindering resilience within Syria includes that the food security index fell 
significantly during the war. Declines in production occurred due to loss of manpower, targeting 
of opposing parties' food supplies, the centralisation of food by the warring parties, siege 
strategies. This led to increased dependence on imports and aid (Ismail et al., 2019). The report 
also identified the decline of social capital, and activities such as smuggling, theft, royalties, 
looting and participation in fighting as associated with deteriorating food security (Ismail et al., 
2019). Health facilities and personnel have been attacked by the Syrian regime (Douedari & 
Howard 2019). The health sector has received uneven funding, either because the state will not 
fund those in opposition areas, or because foreign donors will not, or will only fund certain forms 
of support (Douedari & Howard 2019). Experienced governance professionals and health 
workers have been killed or migrated (Douedari & Howard 2019). 
Research has identified factors encouraging resilience in Syria, on which programming 
can build: 
 An analysis of sectarianism identified political and social mechanisms for mediating 
among sectarian communities, urban planning allowing for mixing of social groups, and 
barriers to outside forces (e.g. other states) that might have an interest in 
instrumentalising sectarian identity, as sources of resilience against sectarianism 
(Rizkallah et al., 2019) 
 Functioning markets, access to loans and capital are shown to be effective in building 
resilience (Howe et al., 2018) 
 Social networks are shown to be important in Syria as sources of jobs and support. 
Programming should work with these, or seek to rebuild them in areas where migration 
has weakened them (Howe et al., 2018). 
 Women and youth earning money report better self-esteem and self-reliance, and other 
welfare outcomes. However, working youth spend less time in education and women 
have increased overall their workloads as they usually have to still do the housework. 
Vulnerable men may be losing out (Howe et al., 2018). 
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 Existing adaptive strategies such as home schooling or tutoring, growing more food at 
home to overcome disrupted supply chains, or entrepreneurship in North East Syria, can 
be supported. Less positive adaptations, such as the use of unsafe fuels in the home, 
can be reformed (Stein, 2020). 
Lessons and evidence from programmes undertaken in Syria include: 
 An evaluation of DFAT work in Syria recommends that the organisation limits its focus on 
resilience on one or two sectors, so that it can be effective with a relatively small 
programme (DFAT, 2019). 
 The need for long-term planning and integrated programmes to build resilience. 
 Support 'grassroots governance' such as health directorates in opposition-controlled 
areas (Douedari & Howard, 2019). 
 Seek to discourage attacks on healthcare, food or other systems vital to citizens' 
resilience (Douedari & Howard, 2019; Ismail et al., 2019). 
 The need to co-ordinate effectively between actors. 
 Cash assistance is reported as the most favoured form of assistance by recipients, 
followed by livelihood programmes and some types of skills training (Mercy Corps, 2019; 
Stein, 2020). 
2. Synthesis reports  
Maxwell, D., Stites, E., Robillard, S. C., & Wagner, M. (2017). Conflict and Resilience: A 
Synthesis of Feinstein International Center Work on Building Resilience and 
Protecting Livelihoods in Conflict-related Crises. Boston: Feinstein International 
Center, Tufts University. https://fic.tufts.edu/assets/FIC-Publication-Q2_web_2.26s.pdf 
Conflict presents distinct challenges for resilience programming.  Moreover, the report notes that 
there 'has been significantly less research and application in the case of conflict'.  
Some of the main differences brought about by conflict include that assets, which would normally 
help households be more resilient, can become liabilities as they are looted or attacked; and that 
membership of certain social groups, which may act as support in ordinary times, can also lead 
to targeting (pp. 8-9). Assets can also be indirectly stripped through processes such as erosion of 
market systems, insecurity leading to a lack of mobility, loss of infrastructure, collapse of health, 
education and social security systems, land occupation, environmental degradation, collapse of 
local governance, marginalisation of certain groups, and erosion of social and political networks. 
The main findings of the report are that: 
 The destruction or theft of assets, and the disruption of economic systems, undermines 
livelihoods and people's ability to recover. 
 Those displaced by conflict are cut off from their livelihoods. They often adapt by taking 
up dangerous livelihoods, although some find new, improved opportunities in new 
settings with different power structures. 
 Conflict may exacerbate other vulnerabilities such as natural and economic hazards, 
competition over natural resources, chronic poverty, poor governance or marginalisation 
based on identity.  
 Social networks can help people survive conflict and other shocks, but can impose 
particular obligations on some such as women. 
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 The effects of conflict, such as disability, displacement or economic destruction, can be 
long-lasting. 
 Investing in livelihoods cannot alone stabilise conflict-affected societies. Therefore it is 
important to understand conflict dynamics in order to minimise the risk of doing harm 
through programming and, where possible, to contribute to peace. 
It suggests that Raven-Roberts (2006) is a key framework for analysing resilience in conflicts.  
Twigg, J., & Calderone, M. (2019). Building livelihood and community resilience. 
Lessons for policy and programming from Somalia and Zimbabwe. Working paper, 
London: ODI. https://www.odi.org/publications/11265-building-livelihood-and-
community-resilience-lessons-somalia-and-zimbabwe 
The report notes that there has been little research on 'the relationships between insecurity and 
fragility and resilience, based on empirical evidence from programmes' (p. 8). There is more on 
'issues linked to climate resilience or informal coping mechanisms'. 
The report focuses on two programmes run by Cesvi in Somalia and Zimbabwe, discussed 
below. There is relatively limited evidence on impact for both projects, which the report notes 
are 'delivering long-term and potentially sustainable gains at scale'.  
Discussion of the projects raises important points about feasibility and effectiveness in fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts. These include: 
 In FCAS, donors need adaptive management and flexible programming. 
 The need to invest in background analysis to understand context-specific vulnerabilities 
and resilience. 
 That migration and urbanisation are adaptive strategies, and can contribute to 
development 
 The need to target marginalised groups to reduce vulnerability. 
 Accountable and participatory programming. 
 A governance-oriented approach involving public and private actors to help build 
sustainable resilience. 
 The need for a long-term vision and durable solutions (e.g. reintegration of displaced 
persons) 
 The need for multi-dimensional solutions to build resilience to interrelated risks  
 Innovative methodological approaches to help tackle health, social and economic issues, 
using multi-stakeholder collaboration. 
Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) Consortium in Somalia from 2013-19.  
The programme started by targeting households for DRR, WASH and shelter, and livelihoods 
support, before moving to an approach with 'sectors identified by communities themselves'. The 
programme moved a from humanitarian-first (ie disaster management plans and early warning 
systems) to a graduated approach to community resilience (community mobilisation and 
training).  
Findings of the report showed: 
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 there were sometimes tensions between participants and non-participants, and stressed 
the need for links through trade and migration. Programmes should therefore work across 
sectors and scales (p. 16).  
 The importance of a 'systems approach' to understand resilience by, for example, 
considering migration as a mode of resilience too. 
 The importance of an 'adaptive approach', which helped the programme to deal with 
shocks and barriers (floods, instability etc). 
 Resilience was measured on the Dietary Diversity Score, the Food Consumption Score, 
the Household Asset Score and the Coping Strategy Index. However, the impact of the 
scheme was hard to gauge, because of poorly designed questionnaires. 'Inconsistencies 
in data collection, trimming and sample selection made an overall quantitative estimate of 
the programme’s impact difficult, to the point where there was insufficient valid 
information to draw conclusive insights from the evaluation'. 
Zimbabwe 
A five year programme (2011-16) in Zimbabwe, funded by the EU and implemented by Cesvi. 
One of its main components was the Shashe citrus initiative. The programme featured 
community and partnership elements to allow communities to 'build adaptive capacity and 
institutions'.It introduced new crops and aimed to foster contract farming. It was recognised that 
the shift from subsistence to commercial farming would need 'the acquisition of new skills and 
competencies, which might take several years to develop.' 
Consideration was given to local power dynamics. Initially, the programme planned to create a 
cooperative but this was seen as vulnerable to government bureaucrats, so a 'common property 
management' system was used instead. The programme found that 'developing resilience 
partnerships is often complex and time-consuming, especially under difficult operating 
conditions.' in this case, it sought to work with well-established civil society organisations. 
External shocks and barriers included poor economic conditions and governance. The report 
found that this may have 'opened up space to engage with private sector actors'. There is little 
evidence of impact, although the report points to income from Cesvi schemes in 2016. 
 
Bond. (2017). What does resilience mean in practice? Collective learning from 
multiple agencies. Learning paper. London: Bond 
https://www.bond.org.uk/sites/default/files/resource-
documents/ppa_learning_paper_resilience_in_practice.pdf   
This guide, produced with input from a number of NGOs, notes that 'while these contexts may be 
the hardest ones to work in, arguably it is these contexts that would most benefit from resilience 
programming. In FCAS, resilience is critical to provide a strong foundation for meeting 
humanitarian and development goals – ranging from keeping families safe and protected to 
improving incomes and health outcomes' (p. 10). 
NGOs undertaking resilience work in FCAS: 
 Need a conflict sensitive or peacebuilding approach 
 Fragile contexts can change suddenly, and crises are likely to happen at any moment. 
Resilience programmes in fragile contexts need to maintain the capacity to switch into 
emergency response mode rapidly. Having crisis modifiers designed into programmes 
from the outset make this switch both possible and efficient. 
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 In contexts where the reach of the state is limited, programmers can still establish 
Disaster Management Committees (or similar) and aim to work through them' link to state 
if possible. 
Lewis, D., Kebede, G., Brown, A., Mackie, P., & Dickenson, K. (2019). Urban Crises and 
the Informal Economy: Surviving, Managing Thriving in Post-Conflict Cities.  UN 
Habitat. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020-
02/urban_crises_and_the_informal.pdf 
The report analyses the informal mechanisms of survival in five post-conflict cities: Cali, Dohuk, 
Hargeisa, Karachi and Kathmandu. It is based on fieldwork in these cities. It shows the role of 
the informal economy and solidarity networks in supporting resilience and recovery, as 
well as the potential persistence of conflict economies such as drugs and arms trade.  
The feasibility of programmes is therefore determined by the stage of the conflict. During the 
'conflict relief' stage, programmes should focus on 'doing no harm' and supporting local capacity 
to cover gaps in basic services. In the 'stabilisation' stage, programmes should help provide 
basic infrastructure and support worker organisations and solidarity economies. In the 
'development' stage, programmes should help build workers’ rights and social security. Improved 
shelter, land rights, a safe environment, and basic services for livelihoods and living 
accommodation are needed. All programming should therefore involve multiple stakeholders 
from civil society, local and national governments, and donors. 
It suggests supportive interventions to help informal economic activity. Those planning 
interventions should consider what stage of the conflict the city is in and tailor the focus of their 
interventions accordingly (conflict relief, stabilisation and development).  All interventions should 
play close attention to context, and acknowledge the capacity of informal systems when building 
partnerships. Based on this, it suggests specific entry points for programmes to support 
resilience. There is little information on impact. 
Cordaid. (2019). Enhancing resilience in fragile and conflict- affected contexts linking 
disaster risk reduction with conflict risk analysis and conflict risk reduction: Cordaid 
experiences. Cordaid. https://www.cordaid.org/en/news/enhancing-resilience-fragile-
conflict-affected-contexts/ 
The report outlines the community-managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) approach, which 
includes the following steps: 
 Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment & Analysis (based on hazard, vulnerability and 
capacity analysis, all 3 of which are related to the overall disaster risk).  
 Joint Action Planning, for disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction activities. 
 Set up of community level DRR Committees or (district/urban level) DRR 
MultiStakeholder Platforms.  
 Implementation of DRR Action Plans, with community, government and donor resources.  
 Monitoring and Evaluation, including documenting best practices.  
 Knowledge sharing and Advocacy, for sustainability and upscaling 
It describes its use in several context. The South Sudan project ‘Interlinking Peacebuilding, 
Decentralisation and Development (IPDD)’ 2013-2017.aimed to ‘increase human security in 
(former) Western Bahr el Gazal and Eastern Equatoria states through interlinking and 
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strengthening community-based peacebuilding initiatives, decentralised government services 
and socio-economic development (peace dividend)’. Work included community risk 
assessments, early warning systems, peace conferences, the establishment of committees on 
risk and resources including different groups of people, training in farming and conflict 
transformation, lending and saving groups and public water management works. 
There is no evidence on the impact of the programme. However, the following lessons were 
learned: 
 The project strengthened trust and relationships between different ethnic communities, 
and between communities and local, traditional and state authorities;  
 Women and youth are effective change agents, so they need to be involved in all project 
phases and activities;  
 Combining DRR and Peace dialogue activities reduces conflict risks;  
 In a fragile context, it is important to use a flexible approach so one is able to adapt 
activities according to the changing reality 
Cordaid's experience shows the importance of analysing conflict risks as well as natural hazards. 
It has developed a Conflict (Risk) Analysis Tool for use in FCAS. It has six steps: 
 Step 1: Conduct a conflict (risk) analysis. When doing this step, ensure that you consider 
in your analysis: Conflict Profile (incl. type of conflict, level of conflict – e.g. local, 
national); Conflict Causes (environmental, political, economic, socio-cultural); Conflict 
Actors (stakeholders involved, power relations, role in conflict); Conflict Dynamics 
(analysing trends, risks, opportunities); Summary of data, and analysis (high – medium – 
low conflict risk).  
 Step 2.a: Determine the scope and focus of the project (part of planning phase). Discuss 
what is appropriate in the context. Work on a conflict sensitive resilience/DRR project, or 
on Conflict risk reduction.  
 Step 2.b: Community Action Planning for the Resilience project in a context or area 
affected by conflict, considering conflict risk and disaster risk (including climate change).  
 Step 3: Establish or strengthen Community structures for the Resilience project. This 
may include existing development, DRR, or other committees at a community level, 
and/or specific peace committees.  
 Step 4: Implementation of Resilience measures, to address disaster risks and/or conflict 
risks. A focus on livelihood security in this stage is important.  
 Step 5: Monitoring and Documentation of the outputs and outcomes of the Resilience 
project (including collecting stories of change).  
 Step 6: Advocacy & Fundraising for upscaling the work done, to further enhance people’s 
resilience. 
As well as increased analysis, it recommends a multi-stakeholder approach, involving different 
groups in working, and the advocacy for more government and CSO capacity and resources to 
enhance resilience. 
Peters, K., Dupar, M., Opitz-stapleton, S., Lovell, E., Budimir, M., & Brown, S. (2020). 
Climate change, conflict and fragility: An evidence review and recommendations for 
research and action. London: ODI. https://www.odi.org/publications/17015-climate-
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change-conflict-and-fragility-evidence-review-and-recommendations-research-and-
action 
This report reviews evidence on the links between climate change and conflict, and discusses 
how programming can be implemented in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. 
Poorly designed climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes have the potential to 
exacerbate inequalities in communities and create greater frictions – with social tensions and 
even the potential for small-scale armed violence. Where such programmes are not conflict-
sensitive, they can inadvertently deprive some groups to the benefit of others and inflame social 
tensions  (p. 9) 
Evidence on the link between climate change and conflict is mixed, with climate likely only one 
factor. The report emphasises the need for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change 
adaptation (CCA) in conflict contexts. Such programmes should ensure they 'do no harm' (i.e. do 
not contribute to the conflict). There is also 'potential for well-designed disaster risk reduction 
initiatives to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding'. DRR is thought to be able to reduce 
risks of conflicts arising from conflict (p. 17).  
However, ‘little scholarship exists on how DRR can effectively be implemented in fragile or 
conflict-affected contexts (and even less on lessons learned, or what was tried and failed)' (p. 
18). There is an evidence gap on how disasters are managed by non-state armed groups. There 
is also a 'gap in the ability of implementers to be able to effectively design and deliver (and for 
donors to effectively procure and select) implementation activities that will be conflict sensitive' 
(p. 28) 
The report recommends, among other things, that conflict sensitivity should be considered in 
every stage of programming. However, 'donors should not require conflict-sensitive outcomes to 
be measured in results frameworks: projects should not be penalised for noticing negative 
impacts on conflict, since this is a core step in conflict sensitivity.' Moreover, 'the skills and 
experience within teams carrying out research or implementing projects in FCAS need to be 
interdisciplinary, ensuring coverage across themes, sectors and institutional types. At least one 
conflict advisor and a gender and marginalisation expert should be included within teams' (p. 28) 
Programmes need to consider the complexity of interrelated shocks and stresses in FCAS. 
Programmes 'need to incorporate consideration of these multiple challenges in their design and 
implementation' (p. 34). More generally, it advises 'establishing an integrated cadre of experts 
from across the climate, disaster, conflict and peace disciplines' to provide guidance on how to 
undertake DRR in conflict areas. 
Tearfund. (2015). Impact and learning report 2015. Tearfund. 
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impact-and-learning-report-2015-inspiring-change 
Tearfund's programmes focused on 'local and collectively-owned solutions, individuals and 
communities reduce their dependence on external support (money, training, handouts) over time, 
building long-term resilience'. They included disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change 
adaptation (CCA) work. They sought to build resilience in humanitarian responses, build social 
capital, and contribute across multiple sectors. The report describes how their work contributed 
to resilience. 
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It emphasises the role of local civil society organisations. In Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis 
(2014), Tearfund conducted research in Delta villages on 'the role of local faith communities 
(LFCs), particularly that of the local Christian church, in supporting the resilience and coping 
strategies of the villages'. It argues that one village recovered a lot better - building infrastructure, 
improving shelters, population growth - than another because 'the church in Village A was very 
inclusive of the Buddhist community, which fostered a sense of unity; the pastor was committed 
to equality and acceptance regardless of religious differences. In contrast, the church in Village B 
encouraged suspicion of the Buddhist community, which led to social segregation and damaged 
any hope of building a sense of community' more community focused leadership, sense of 
community.' 
It emphasises the importance of social capital, in the form of networks of trust between 
groups. It points to self-help groups in Nazareth (Adama) town in central Ethiopia. 12,000 are 
funded by Tearfund across Ethiopia and often paid for by local churches, meaning they are very 
sustainable. They provide support and allow members to share skills, provide loans based on 
member savings. These provide important safety nets - money and support - for disasters (p. 
42). 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., & Ager, A. (2015). Local faith communities and the promotion of 
resilience in contexts of humanitarian crisis. Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(2), 202–
221. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fev001 
This scoping study highlights the potential role of local faith communities (LFCs) in supporting 
resilience. It is based on a literature review and discussion with practitioners belonging to the 
Joint Learning Initiative (JLI). The positive roles of LFCs are their existing volunteer networks and 
communications, leadership roles in communities, links across communities and countries, 
buildings, their ability to provide mobilising narratives to spur recovery, as well as psychosocial 
support to believers, the authority to challenge social norms and the social and political capital to 
broker peace. Negative effects can include a lack of neutrality, especially in mixed-faith areas, 
and a lack of inclusion in some areas. It argues that further research is needed to understand 
these dynamics. 
Stites, E., & Bushby, K. (2017). Livelihood strategies and interventions in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas. London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 
https://securelivelihoods.org/wp-content/uploads/7.-Livelihood-strategies-and-
interventions-in-fragile-and-conflict-affected-areas_-2012-to-2016.pdf   
The report suggests that there is a 'lack of clarity' on how resilience can be measured and 
evaluated.  
It surveys strategies used by populations in FCAS, as well as donor interventions seeking to 
make populations more resilient. 
Strategies and tools used by populations to adapt to shocks in FCAS include: 
diversification; urbanisation; and migration; the use of social capital and connectedness (e.g. 
connections beyond the family and community allowing people to access support) (pp. 11-15). 
The report notes that research has highlighted the importance of social connections in 
promoting resilience: 'we see that the most important variable in surviving the famine – who 
you know and how well you are able to leverage these relations – can be difficult to influence 
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through external interventions'. However, they hard for donors or policymakers to discern and act 
upon (p. 15). 
In siege situations, such as those found in Syria, adaptations include: rooftop gardening 
and home production of medical supplies; use of the black market; joining armed groups; local, 
ad hoc forms of governance; (p.12) 
Evaluations of livelihoods interventions show: political economy analysis can help donors 'do 
no harm', for example by trying to avoid situations where humanitarian aid is taken by armed 
groups.  
They note a theoretical distinction between 'interventions that contribute to civilian protection and 
meet basic needs; help protect and recover assets; and strengthen institutions and influence 
policy to improve livelihood strategies and the accumulation of assets', but that many 
programmes implement aspects of all three types of intervention (p. 16). 
The report discusses the evidence on a variety of aid modalities. 
Cash is popular in conflict zones 'because it allows people to choose how to support their own 
livelihood strategies', and can support local markets (pp. 18-19). Cash transfers are also efficient, 
meaning more resilience programming can be undertaken. It is not appropriate in all situations, 
e.g. where there are weak markets. It therefore notes that 'tools that incorporate market analysis, 
nutrition, modality-specific references, risk- or harm-mitigation tools, process-oriented tools, and 
– importantly – livelihood-specific tools' are available and useful.  
Food aid means households 'they can direct some of their resources towards other, potentially 
longer- term, livelihood goals. In addition, food assistance is often sold or exchanged in conflict 
settings, allowing households to acquire other essential commodities.' However, the report is 
unsure of how it links to longer-term resilience (p. 20). Cash was found to be safer than 
vouchers in one study and to allow recipients to buy more diverse items.  
On infrastructure, the review suggests targeting was a major challenge to infrastructure 
programmes, and that there was limited evidence to suggest that investing in infrastructure yields 
stabilisation benefits.' It can be a stimulus for growth, but can also bring conflict to remote areas. 
On public works in conflict areas, there is some limited evidence. The effectiveness of foreign 
direct investment is also context-specific. It requires good governance, markets, etc. to work.  
Livestock and farming interventions can be effective, but need to be targeted effectively so 
that livestock do not lead to recipients being targeted. Mobility is seen as a key resource for 
farmers and pastoralists and 'interventions that promote security, especially in cross-border 
areas where migration patterns are common, would bolster pastoral and agrarian livelihoods 
further'. 
Microfinance can be effective, but should be used carefully. The authors note that in some 
cases after tsunami, lenders exploited microfinance to lend at high rates. It has been effective in 
certain regions, although the poorest often cannot access. There is limited evidence on 
programming on 'making markets work for the poor' (M4P) in conflict situations. 
Value chain development needs to analyse both formal and informal sectors. Donors need 
'deep understanding of local contexts' to see who it will benefit. Political economy analysis is 
crucial, especially in conflict areas. 
16 
On taxation policies, which can increase the resilience of state institutions and provide public 
goods, the authors note the need to understand informal taxation too. In many fragile or conflict-
affected areas, non-state actors collect informal 'taxes'. 
On job creation, evidence points to the need to assess the economy and power relations. 
Programmes need good links to private sector and education. There is little evidence on links 
between jobs and stability. On training, the authors note that that provided by donors does not 
always fit the context. However, it can have benefits for livelihoods. 
The authors highlight a number of themes arising from their analysis: the need for PEA; the 
dangers of elite capture; the need for conflict sensitivity, to try to do no harm, and reverse power 
dynamics behind conflict; the gender analysis; robust needs assessments; market analysis; 
targeting of programmes; and the variable quality of evaluations, with many focusing on outputs 
rather than rigorously assessing impacts. 
Overall, their review of existing evaluations and academic literature shows: 
 Relatively little analysis of resilient livelihoods in the face of conflict (p. 7) 
 Because of the complexity of conflict, natural disasters and other shocks in FCAS, it is 
agreed that 'interventions to build resilience are not a quick fix but rather require 
extensive commitments in time, planning and follow-up'. 
Twigg, J. (2015). Disaster Risk Reduction. London: ODI. 
https://odihpn.org/resources/disaster-risk-reduction/ 
The book contains a short chapter on DRR, social crisis and conflict. It notes that conflict has 
many negative effects on resilience, and that for reasons of security and prioritisation, DDR is 
less likely to be undertaken in conflict zones. Where it is implemented, DDR needs to be conflict 
sensitive to avoid doing more harm than good. 
It suggests that there is 'some potential for linking DRR and conflict management work.' The two 
can be linked effectively, especially in disputes over resources. Conflict sensitivity is essential, 
however. 
Given the difficulties of conflict, 'where there are different communities, social, religious and 
ethnic groups in a particular location, with associated inter-group tensions, agencies should try to 
locate themselves and their interventions so that they can give support across group divides, 
without losing sight of the need to help the most vulnerable' (p. 294). 
It gives the successful example of the Society for Health, Education, Environment and Peace 
(SHEEP), which began a community-based DRR project in the area in 2009 in Central Java. 
Dialogues and collection of information on land and water were used to improve awareness of 
the causes of flooding, and allowed an early warning system to be set up (p. 292). 
3. Africa 
European Commission. (2017). EU Approach to Building Resilience to Withstand Food 
Crises in African Drylands (Sahel and Horn of Africa) 2007-2015. European 
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Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/evaluation-
resiliencel-final-report-vol-i-main_en.pdf 
The report evaluates the EU's resilience programming in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the 
Sahel; and Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in the Horn of Africa. This encompassed several 
programmes including AGIR in West Africa from 2012, SHARE in East Africa from 2011, and 
RESET in Ethiopia. 
On feasibility, the evaluation drew a number of lessons. These included:  
 
 The need to better adapt programming to complex emergencies and fragile states, and 
particularly conflict situations. It found that the gaps in service provision in areas with 
weak institutions made it hard for the comprehensive package of support to be delivered 
(p. 63). 
 Working with governments where possible, and without where necessary. In Somalia the 
EU worked mainly through NGO consortiums, but increasing worked with 'nascent' 
governments at national and local levels. In Mali and Burkino Faso, the EU worked with 
NGO-consortiums in fragile areas of the countries, and the government where it operated 
effectively (p. 21).  
 Emphasising that resilience is multidimensional, and is therefore complex to understand 
and act upon (p. 7). 
 The need for conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity in certain contexts (p. 16). 
 Although the EU's analysis of conflict drivers was insufficient, there was some good 
practice. This included 'the increasing attention to and planned investment in addressing 
livestock migration routes; and securitisation through structural programmes in West 
Africa; the EU-commissioned food security analysis in Ethiopia was an innovative 
example of an analysis of root causes including climate change, demographics, and 
technological, policy and governance factors.' 
 it was noted that a policy focus on using resilience programming to prevent migration was 
misguided. Most research shows that political reasons more often drive migration; that 
migration is itself an important coping strategy and thus aids resilience; and that 
development and resilience programming is often found to facilitate migration in the 
short-term (until an area's income reaches $7,000/capita). In this case, the decision to 
focus on preventing migration was a choice informed by political priorities rather than 
research (p. 11). 
On impact, the report could not measure resilience to future shocks. This is because the EU 
does not have a standardised approach to doing so. While 'established food security indicators 
were used to signal short- term progress', they 'fell short of being able to explain changes in 
latent capacities to manage future shocks' (iii). 
The programmes' successes were mainly in the area of support for weather and economic 
shocks than those driven by conflict or governance issues.  
On the question of whether interventions should be integrated single-sector or multi-sector, the 
report worked from the assumption that because resilience is complex, it requires integrated 
support across sectors (p. 66). However, it argued that its own intervention could achieve this by 
seeking to complement other interventions in other sectors (p. 66): 
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For one donor to approach resilience from a sectoral perspective does not contradict the 
resilience approach per se. Ultimately sectoral ministries need to take ownership of resilience 
programming. What is important is that the EU intervenes in relevant sector(s) where it has a 
comparative advantage and that these sectoral interventions are appropriately coordinated 
within a multi-sectoral framework. 
Given this limitation of working within a small number of focal concentration sectors achieving 
resilience outcomes, coordination with development partners appeared to be key to providing 
the necessary range of complementary sectoral interventions 
Cusumano, E., & Hofmaier, S. (2020). Projecting Resilience Across the Mediterranean. 
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23641-0 
The book analyses the Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) missions launched by the 
European Union in the Sahel. These include European Union Capacity Building Mission 
(EUCAP) Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali. 
It takes a critical stance to the EU's resilience focus, suggesting that there is a lack of 
consistency in its use of the concept and that it 'cherry picks' where it tried to foster 
resilience. EU programmes sometimes seek to increase state resilience by supplying security 
equipment to oppressive regimes, and sometimes to fund anti-regime civil society groups to 
increase social resilience. 
The authors argue that the EU's resilience programmes in its neighbouring countries are 
security focused and neglect other facets of resilience. They suggest that instead, 'it would 
be 'worthwhile for the EU to act in a comprehensive manner, valorising and integrating its 
different instruments and sectors of expertise: resilience in the Sahel would be fostered by 
implementing a truly integrated and sustainable approach, able to take into consideration the 
different fragilities and challenges which are shaping the local and the regional environments'. 
EU work packaged as 'resilience' is too 'siloed' and does not link enough with resilience 
work in other sectors. For example, the EUCAP Sahel Niger programme helps build capacity in 
the Nigerien security sector. It has various objectives including curbing migration, but ignores the 
fact that migration is a source of resilience in Niger. Similarly, EUTM Mali provides training for 
security forces, but no consideration of the political dynamics that cause instability. MINUSMA in 
Mali is also security-focused and fails to address social cohesion, governance or climate shocks 
affecting Mali. The authors argue that the EU focuses on 'stressors' rather than 'fragilities' in 
these states. 
SomRep. (2018). Positive Deviance in Somalia: Why are some households more 
resilient than others? Nairobi: World Vision. 
https://wvusstatic.com/2018/SomReP_Positive_Deviance_Study_Report.pdf 
The Somalia Resilience Programme is a consortium of seven NGOs (ACF, ADRA, CARE, 
COOPI, DRC, Oxfam and World Vision). Its work includes: 
 Enhancing livelihood diversification and improved access to markets, financial services 
and basic livelihood services (adaptive capacity); 
 Fostering collective community action for effective disaster risk management, the 
adoption of positive coping strategies and improved access to formal and informal safety 
nets (absorptive capacity); 
 Strengthening equitable and sustainable natural resource management, and;  
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 Improving community governance for transformative capacity. 
The study used a positive deviance (PD) framework to show the factors that allowed a minority to 
achieve well-being. It used interviews and household surveys of food security and recovery from 
drought.3 
 
SomReP staff identified what they hypothesized to be high impact interventions. These included 
Savings Groups (Village Savings and Loans Associations or VSLAs); Community Animal Health 
Workers (CAHWs), interventions focused on improving water for human consumption and 
livelihood production; and Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) committees or Community-based 
Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) systems. 
 
The report found that these high impact interventions were associated with better coping and 
food security status. 
 It found that the programmes could not respond to shocks quickly enough.  
 The VSLAs did not attract the most vulnerable households. Membership was dominated 
by households that could afford to save. 
 It therefore finds that it is important to 'sequence, layer and target' interventions to help 
the most needy onto 'resilience pathways'. Interventions should be carefully targeted to 
specific income or occupation groups. 
 VSLAs were not sufficient to cope with large co-variate shocks. The report argued that 
mitigating mechanisms - contingency livestock management practices, planting and 
storing food, livelihood diversification and timely humanitarian assistance - were needed 
to deal with shocks. 
 Qualitative assessments showed that VSLAs built social capital, self-esteem and 
empowerment, and helped share ideas and expertise. VSLAs and NGO efforts to 
strengthen governance were also found to be important - e.g. committees for various 
disasters. 
 Those identified as PDs also reported cultural factors helping their resilience: optimism, 
entrepreneurialism, community and family networks, and culture of preparedness and 
sharing. Others surveyed saw PDS as wealthier, having multiple livelihood strategies and 
better access to credit and better networks. 
 The report also found that 'other important predictors of Food Consumption and 
Household Hunger Scores include livelihood zone and type (pastoralists and peri-urban 
were worst off while salaried/self employed and crop or mixed farmers were best off). 
Multiple income sources had a strong effect. Drought severity as reported by 
respondents was significantly related to outcomes as were selling livestock as a coping 
strategy (positive) and taking children out of school (negative)' 
 Being in regular communication with people outside of their community was also 
associated with better food security outcomes, although the report did not identify the 
reason for this. 
                                                   
3 The measured used were: Food Consumption Score: this reflects the weighted average of the frequency of 
consumption (during the week before the interview) of basic food groups, coded to consumption adequacy 
groups • Household Hunger Score: the frequency of experiencing hunger, coded to severity of hunger categories 
• Household Food Insecurity Access Scale Groups (HFIAP) • Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) • 
Perceived Recovery 
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USAID. (2020). Pathways To Peace: Addressing Conflict and Strengthening Stability in 
a Changing Climate Lessons Learned From Resilience and Peacebuilding Programs 
in the Horn of Africa Technical Report. USAID.  
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/pathways-peace-addressing-conflict-and-
strengthening-stability-changing-climate-lessons 
The assessment considers to what degree USAID's programmes 'simultaneously contribute to 
reducing the risks of intercommunal tensions and building resilience against climate shocks and 
stresses' in the largely arid and semi-arid lands in which they worked. 
 
Peace Centers for Climate and Social Resilience (PCCSR) 
The PCCSR was funded by USAID and run by Haramaya University and fostered collaborative 
activities in pastoral communities (kebeles) in three districts (woredas) in the Borana Zone of 
Ethiopia. 
 
These aimed to use peacebuilding to foster greater freedom of movement and enable better 
access to natural resources; foster collaborative community action; create more adaptive 
capacity and strengthen conflict prevention, mitigation and reduction (PMR) capacity. 
 
USAID's assessment found that: 
 Created 'attitudinal change among its beneficiaries' 
 Increased awareness of conflict responses among authorities, involving women's and 
youth networks. 
 Collaborative CCA activities (ponds, bush thinning) 'contributed to increasing the sense 
of mutual understanding and solidarity among the different groups' 
 
The assessment drew the following lessons: 
 Climate change as an 'external threat' can be used as an organisational principle and 
bring together potentially conflicting groups. 
 Some activities work as to foster collaboration more than others. 
 Long-term commitment is needed to foster resilience and peaceful. 
 The involvement of beneficiaries in planning increased their commitment. 
Peace III in East Africa  
The programme was run by Pact and Mercy Corps (2014-19) in the border areas between 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. 
It aimed to foster cross border dialogue; support 'peace actors' such as women's groups; help 
local governments' conflict prevention; facilitate peace and natural resource agreements; 
encourage outreach and engagement between border forces and security; help to draft a 
national peace policy in Uganda. 
 
USAID's assessment found that the programme was 'largely successful in reducing instances of 
inter-communal conflict and building resilience in the targeted communities'. 
It highlighted that creating lines of communication between communities was effective. Women's 
forums were also effective. Cross-border peace and natural resource agreements were found to 
be helpful, as were cross-border CCA projects. The project helped improve capacity among 
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national actors to strengthen national security bodies' ability to provide early warnings and 
maintain security. 
 
It drew the following lessons:  
 Collaborative capacity brings resilience, through new norms and practices for managing 
resources and conflict and linkages between communities. 
 Beneficiaries need climate knowledge and its implications for their livelihoods as well as 
CCA adaptations. 
 External conflict shocks/security challenges can threaten the project. 
 Long-term government support is needed to ensure sustainability by creating new 
institutional arrangements to respond to conflict. 
  
 
Improving Community Resilience in the Face of Conflicts and Environmental Shocks: Mellit and 
Umm Keddada Localities in North Darfur State 
 
The programme included climate change adaptation (CCA) to increase community resilience; 
enhance livelihood strategies; reduce local conflicts and improve natural resource management 
(NRM); the creation of higher committees for the community, with sub-committees on water, 
women, youth etc.; exchange visits between villages; youth centres; training on peacebuilding, 
CCA, NRM, microfinance for women, youth, leaders, pastoralists and farmers; and technical 
interventions such as drought-resistant crops. 
 
USAID assessed the programme to be successful in improving integration between communities 
and inclusivity. Peace committees involving women and youth were seen to be essential. 
Technical interventions such as solar energy were also found to enhance resilience to climate 
and providing job opportunities for women. It was noted that the project only ran for a short 
period, and there were concerns over the sustainability of some of the governance issues, 
however (pp. 19-20).  
 
Lessons learned were: 
 The importance of understanding community dynamics and fitting programmes to these 
 That communities should be empowered to help design programmes. 
 Long-term engagement is needed to ensure sustainability. 
 
Overall lessons include: 
 Need to mitigate marginalisation and the potential for existing elites to dominate new 
structures. 
 Participatory needs assessments are useful tools to produce relevant, sustainable 
interventions and ensure commitment from the communities involved. 
 Dispute resolution mechanisms are useful in areas with a history of natural resource 
disputes, but must be embedded into state institutions to be sustainable. 
 Interventions 'need to be inscribed within broader, multi-sectoral efforts to create the 
conditions for these interventions to be sustainable and scalable'. For example, new solar 
power sources helped implement new water availability measures. 
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 A short time-frame can limit 'reach and sustainability'. 
Mercy Corps. (2015). Building community resilience: lessons learned from Mercy 
Corps ’ Stabilizing Vulnerable Communities. Portland: Mercy Corps. 
https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/Building Resilience During 
Conflict_Lessons Learned from CAR_October 2015.pdf 
The Stabilizing Vulnerable Communities in the Central African Republic through the Promotion of 
Inter-Community Dialogue and Economic Cooperation (SVC) began in 2014. It aimed to increase 
the resilience of populations to conflict, and particularly their capacity to resolve disputes and 
build trust. It was a response to fighting between Muslim- and Christian-led armed groups and 
warnings of genocide the previous year, which had been stabilised by African Union and UN 
peacekeeping. The programming was funded by USAID’s Complex Crises Fund (CCF).  
The programme had the following goals: 
 Strengthening the capacity of local leaders in Muslim and Christian communities to 
resolve community conflicts and deal with the legacy of violence in an open, inclusive, 
and sustainable manner;  
 Reinforcing sustainable dispute resolution methods and generating increased trust 
through joint social and economic initiatives benefiting both Christian and Muslim 
communities;  
 Promoting attitudes of tolerance and non-violence through support of inter-faith peace 
messaging. 
This work utilised community leaders (e.g. religious figures), youth engagement, and radio 
broadcasting, as well as economic initiatives. Mercy Corps provided conflict resolution training, 
forums for discussion, and encouraged the signing of reconciliation documents. 
A random survey showed improved perceptions that the conflict was being resolved peacefully 
and trust of the 'other' group. Fighters disarmed and joined peace committees facilitated by the 
programme, and 'community leaders' signed a reconciliation pact in Bouar. This included trade 
integration between communities. Surveys also found that insecurity was the main reason people 
fled during the violence, and, along with reconciliation and economic activities, one of the main 
reasons for return. Dialogues, religious peace messages and radio messages were seen as the 
most effective of the programme's methods for promoting cohesion. However, there is little 
evidence on longer-term impact. 
Lessons include: 
 Community capacity to mitigate conflict can erode as conflicts play out. Therefore conflict 
management efforts such as those undertaken in this programme should be implemented 
before conflict has been resolved and while emergency relief is still being given, if 
necessary. 
 The programme's community-led conflict management activities were effective, and can 
be replicated in other similar crises. 
 Physical security and peacekeeping forces are needed to end violence and allow 
space for the programming. 
23 
 Peacebuilding activities take time to implement because of fear and grievances, and 
communities should not be pressured to do so. Funding should reflect this, and the report 
recommends multi-year, multi-sector funding. 
 It recommends reinforcing peacebuilding efforts and recovery programmes to help 
maintain resilience in the face of tensions arising from elections and similar events in 
future. 
Cash Alliance. (2018). Cash Alliance’s food security and livelihoods project in 
Somalia: Learning, review, and impact assessment. Cash Alliance. 
https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/cash-alliances-food-security-and-livelihoods-
project-in-somalia-learning-review-and-impact-assessment/ 
The report assesses cash transfers implemented by the Cash Alliance for Somalis affected by 
drought in 2017. It distributed cash to 46,613 households.  
The programme was found to improve recipients' short-term resilience and ability to cope 
with the shocks brought by the drought. Cash transfers improved recipients' food security and 
financial situation. This was found to be especially true for IDPs, who often lacked other safety 
nets. However, it was not sufficient to improve access to health or education. The impacts are 
also not thought to be sustainable. Recipients asked for training to help them improve their 
livelihoods after the famine. 
It was found that mobile money enabled recipients to keep their cash transfers secret and 
therefore less likely to be stolen. However, few recipients reported conflict arising from the 
transfers other than community jealousy. This was reduced by a participatory selection system. 
In IDP camps, 'gatekeepers' charged some recipients of cash transfers, and forced those who 
did not pay to leave. Gatekeepers were less of a problem outside of IDP camps. 
 
D’Errico, M., Ngesa, O., & Pietrelli, R. (2020). Assistance in chronic conflict areas: 
evidence from South Sudan. Working Paper. Rome: FAO Agricultural Development 
Economics. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca7731en 
The article provides a statistical analysis of the aid supplied to conflict-affected regions of 
South Sudan. It uses a survey of households in Lakes, Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Northern 
Bahr el Ghaza, asking questions on productive and non-productive assets, dwelling features, 
education, social networks and social safety nets (including access to credit), access to basic 
services (including schools, health facilities and markets), food and non-food consumption, 
conflict and income-generating activities. This was combined with data on conflict events. 
 
The analysis shows that assistance did not reach most in-need. Levels of assistance were 
lower where conflict was more intense. It finds that inaccessibility was not a factor in reducing 
access to aid. Instead it shows that social networks and the lobbying of community groups was 
key, as there was 'a positive association between participation in farmers’ and community police 
groups, and access to formal assistance'. 
 
It recommends mobile cash transfers as a way to reduce corruption, diversify livelihoods 
and allow better targeting in conflict areas.  They can allow beneficiaries to access financial 
services. It also recommends interventions combining the distribution of inputs with rehabilitation 
of local markets to help overcome disruption to services. 
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Pickwick, S. (2020). Navigating the nexus in the Democratic Republic of Congo. New 
York: World Vision. https://www.wvi.org/publications/case-study/congo/navigating-
nexus-democratic-republic-congo 
The report assesses World Vision's work in Rutshuru in the Eastern DRC, from 2002. 
Programmes focused on building community resilience through livelihoods, health, nutrition, 
WASH, education, and school feeding. It identified the following broad factors leading to success: 
(1) a strong, people-centred, community-based approach; (2) flexible project parameters and 
flexible funding; (3) strong leadership and staff retention; and (4) a willingness to take on and 
manage risk.  
It pointed to the problem of working in insecurity, noting that it was ultimately outside of World 
Vision's control (p. 9).  Considering the difficulties of working in conflict-prone areas, the report 
considered whether World Vision could include peacebuilding in its activities. It noted a tendency 
to fall back on usual humanitarian activities as 'non contentious'. However, it argued that the 
relationships it built could 'create an opportunity to safely go deeper and tackle the more 
contentious root causes of fragility, such as land rights, governance issues and ethnicity, if done 
in a sensitive manner and with a good risk assessment. This programming could include local 
social accountability activities to continue to build communities’ capacity to strengthen their 
relationships with decision makers and in turn advocate for their own needs and issues (with 
NGOs playing more of a facilitation role). Another option is working with faith leaders to empower 
them to play a role in addressing such issues and/or in wider development activities or through 
other peacebuilding approaches. Integrating such activities into multi-sectoral programmes would 
widen the scope of the project in working across the nexus and would also bolster sustainability' 
(p. 10). 
Lessons include: 
 The value of a community based and participatory approach. 
 Partnering with other donors in order to work effectively across the nexus. 
 A willingness to take on risk of working in a conflict area built communities' trust and 
acceptance and ' an increased investment in security risk management and flexibility in 
planning and operations'. 
 Joint context analysis and monitoring between donors to understand the complexities of 
FCAS. 
 Build root cause analysis into programmes to understand the causes of conflict. 
 'sustainable, flexible, multiyear, and multi-sectoral programme funding. This can be done 
by including context modifiers/contingency funding to allow flexibility for adaption to 
changes in the context (for worse or better), including to move amongst sectors and/or 
operating modalities. If crisis modifiers do exist in contracts, implementing agencies 
should familiarise themselves with them and request them in a timely and straightforward 
process as needed'. 
 'Programmes in fragile contexts are most likely to succeed when they are well focused 
geographically, multiyear, take an integrated, multi-sectoral approach (including a stress 
on peacebuilding/social cohesion when appropriate) and aim to be impact rather than 
funding driven'. 
 The need for incentives and management support for staff on the ground to make 
decisions to adapt to local conditions/risks. 
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 Ways to assess vulnerabilities on the ground, not just at the macro level. 
Boresha. (2020). Integrating Conflict Sensitivity In Cross-Border Programmes. 
Technical Brief. Boresha consortium. https://boreshahoa.org/ 
Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA) is a 3-year (2018-2020) 
cross border project implemented by a consortium of the Danish Refugee Council, World Vision, 
WYG and CARE International with funding from European Union Trust Fund for Africa. 
The brief discusses implementing conflict sensitivity in the cross-border Mandera triangle (Liban 
and Afder zones in the Somali Region of Ethiopia, Gedo in Somalia and Mandera in Kenya). The 
region has seen conflict over resources, which has been worsened by limited state functions, 
marginalisation, the increased flow of small arms, and violent extremism.  
The programme is multi-sectoral and supplies cash, goods, services and skills into communities. 
In order to prevent these supplies fostering competition and conflict, BORESHA: 
 Carried out assessments of the socio-political, ecological and economic context, to show 
how goods, services and people moved across borders, and noted where conflict 
occurred. 
 Staff were given conflict sensitivity training. This included principles of conflict analysis 
(understanding the profile, causes, actors and dynamics), conflict sensitivity 
(participation, inclusion, respect, transparency and equity), conflict sensitivity in practice, 
conflict sensitivity as it relates to Do No Harm, and use of the conflict sensitivity self-
assessment form. 
 Established a community feedback mechanism. It tracks: beneficiaries’ selection and 
registration to assess process fairness, cases of corruption, satisfaction with services 
(delivery approach, quality, relevance and timing), awareness and use of feedback 
channels and entitlements in the project, follow-up support and recommendations from 
beneficiaries. 
 Established standardised rates for beneficiaries, governments, community members etc. 
to minimise potential conflicts arising from aid. 
 Collaborated with clan elders to ensure inclusion and participation. In-depth consultations 
were held with community members in project design. e.g. rangeland management 
involved the community in discussion the issues, causes of environmental degredation, 
and rehabilitation plans. 
 Sought to include marginalised groups, and to make sure that leaders were legitimate. 
 Made guidelines accessible to stakeholders, and held stakeholder meetings to show 
transparency. 
 Sought to employ staff not allied to clan politics, with high levels of competence and 
knowledge of the local area. 
 Also collaborated with regional programmes and local governments. 
It notes that some vulnerable groups are still excluded, that borders have been closed at times, 
and that governments have attacked the programme for not providing goods such as fuel at 
times. 
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Tranchant, J. P., Gelli, A., Bliznashka, L., Diallo, A. S., Sacko, M., Assima, A., … 
Masset, E. (2019). The impact of food assistance on food insecure populations during 
conflict: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Mali. World Development, 119, 185–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.01.027 
An analysis of the effects of humanitarian aid on households in Mali during conflict. It does not 
use the term resilience, but does talk about the 'protective effect' of food transfers on households' 
food security. Households were able to reduce expenditure on good, and increases in 
micronutrient availability, food consumption and the height of children aged to 2–5 years were 
recorded. However, the analysis also found that less aid was given in areas where armed groups 
operated, pointing to a trade-off between scaling up programmes and needs-based aid. 
 
Baliki, G., Bruck, T., & Stojetz, W. (2018). Drivers of Resilience and Food Security in 
North-east Nigeria: Final Report to the Food and Agriculture Organization Executive 
summary. Berlin: International Security and Development Center. https://isdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Drivers_of_Resilience.pdf 
The report analysed the effects of the FAO's food programme on resilience, food security, and 
conflicts in the community.  
It surveyed locations before and after the programme, including a control group (although 
baseline data did not cover resilience). Resilience was measured using questionnaires on coping 
strategies: selling household assets, using credit to purchase food, spending savings, selling 
productive assets, consuming stored seeds, selling their house or land, and removing children 
from school to measure resilience.  
 The programme increased the food consumption score and decreased likelihood of using 
a harmful coping strategy among beneficiaries. 
 Effects varied according to the degree of conflict. The programme effects on resilience 
were strongest for IDPs and those in low conflict areas 
 An individual's or household's resilience could be derailed by 'a personal shock, like theft 
or loss of a family member. These households require additional support to build 
resilience'. 
 The programme may have worsened perceptions of security. 'the programme may have 
induced beliefs that the expected returns to robbery increased, increasing worries among 
both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about walking alone at night' 
The authors recommend: 
 More and better micro data (especially on resilience) is imperative for understanding and 
monitoring the full diversity, nature and interrelations of food security and conflict. 
 Strengthening food insecurity and resilience requires context-specific and conflict-
sensitive policy approaches that integrate immediate assistance and long-term impacts.  
 Whenever and to the extent possible, programme and policy responses should be 
designed, monitored and evaluated in a way that allows one to assess causal impacts. 
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Bevins, W. (2019). Habbanayé: applying a traditional practice for a more resilient 
future in the Sahel. Brief. Lutheran World Relief. 
https://lwr.org/ai_file_subscribe/file/2469 
Lutheran World Relief implemented Habbanayé -based programmes in order to increase 
community resilience to droughts, armed conflict, loss of remittances or other shocks. It was 
used in Dakoro in Niger (2005-8), Tahoua in Niger (2010-13; 2014-16) and Est in Burkino Faso 
(2013-16). 
 
Habbanayé involves wealthier members of a community loaning out a female cow or goat to 
poorer friends or family, who keep the offspring. It therefore serves to help the poorer members 
of the community build up their stock of animals. It works through social networks. It is practised 
among some pastoralist groups including Fulani in Niger.  
 
The projects focused on women, who often stayed at home to tend sheep and goats while men 
took cows out to find pasture. Habbanayé Solidarity Groups (HSG) were formed, sometimes built 
on women's savings groups. They provide loans and insurance to those who pay in, and buy 
animals from the market for members. As well as helping start Habbanaye groups, LWF helped 
the groups partner with government veterinary agents, provided training to farmers' co-
operatives, feed warehouses, and training on animal fattening, and feed blocks to help animals 
survive. 
 
The report argues that it is 'one tool among many' to increase resilience. It helps build local 
capital, provide more economic resources, increase trust in local networks, and improve self-
organisation. 
 
See also Iyer, P. (2019). Friendship, kinship and social risk management strategies 
among pastoralists in Karamoja. Working paper. 
https://karamojaresilience.org/images/news/2019/201905-conference/theme-4-
resilience-risk-change/iyer_friendship_risk.pdf 
The paper discusses informal mutual insurance systems, based on ethnographic field research 
involving 80 participants in Karamoja, Uganda. Research showed how loans and gifts of livestock 
between 'stock friends' was used as a form of insurance. Although such systems sometimes 
exclude poorer people, they help to insure against short-term shocks and to build social capital 
which will help longer-term resilience. It notes Oxfam in the 1970s and 1980s and Lutheran 
World Relief have worked to encourage and bolster similar practices.  
 
It suggests lessons for resilience programming are: 
 Knowing the influential nodes (persons) in the village or area network, particularly those 
with greater wealth or reliable income, can serve as important lenders during a shock and 
can, therefore, be supported in conflict- sensitive ways.  
 Understanding transfer norms can assist in developing a similar lending programme as 
Habbanaye and aid in restocking of herds.  
 A context- and conflict-sensitive community project based on social networks of support 
could result in greater social cohesion, support to customary systems, and be a truly 
community-based approach. 
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IASC. (2019). Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group - Evaluation of the 
Drought Response in Ethiopia Inception Report. IASC. 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2020-
02/Ethiopia%20IAHE%20final%20Feb%202020_1.pdf 
The drought response was only partially successful in restoring affected people’s livelihoods and 
were often not able to prevent affected people from becoming less resilient to droughts and other 
crises over time. This is due to the rapid succession of several droughts; a response that did not 
sufficiently focus on livelihood interventions, especially in agriculture and WASH; and a lack of 
funding for livelihoods and resilience interventions. 
 
Taylor, S. A. J. (2014). Fragile and conflict-affected states: Exploring the relationship 
between governance, instability and violence. Stability, 3(1), 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.dy 
Taylor, S. (2013). Fragile but not helpless: Scaling Up Nutrition in Fragile and Conflict-
Affected States. London: World Vision UK. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/fragile-
not-helpless-scaling-nutrition-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states 
These reports consider the implementation of the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) programme in 
fragile and conflict-affected states. SUN is a multi-sectoral intervention that aims to engage 
states, making it harder to implement in areas with poor governance that are also more likely to 
need it.  The analysis argues that it is possible to engage with local governance, even in FCAS. 
FCAS encompasses a broad range of governance capacities. These capacities can be improved 
with programmes such as SUN. 
Taylor's articles analysed a number of FCAS according to whether they has signed up to SUN. It 
used bivariate regression and principal component analysis to identify associations among 
various factors likely to encourage a state to join SUN (e.g. whether there were high levels of 
malnutrition, active civil society agitation etc., or whether there was strong governance, health 
systems or economic performance. It found that 'engagement with SUN was driven more 
strongly by what we may call the policy ‘supply-side’ (interest and capacity within government) 
rather than from the demand-side' (need or pressure for action from the population). It also found 
that the FCAS label encompassed a range of governance capacities, and that 'some fragile 
states were able to activate the necessary government and governance apparatus to coordinate 
and then navigate accession to the SUN initiative, in a sense irrespective of the ambient level of 
instability and/or violence'. 
Although not packaged as a resilience initiative, SUN works to improve individuals' resilience and 
governance capacity, and the programme offers lessons specific to FCAS. Specifically, it 
suggests that there are more entry points for resilience programming that engages with 
local governance capacity than might be assumed. Moreover, that SUN itself improved 
governance and was attractive to government actors because it could attract development rather 
than humanitarian aid (i.e. can create a virtuous circle). 
Bonilla. J., Carson, K., Kiggundu, G., Morey, M., Ring, H., Nillesen, E., Erba, G. and 
Michel, S. (2017). Humanitarian Cash Transfers in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: Evidence from UNICEF’s ARCC II Programme. Washington: American 
Institutes for Research. 
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https://www.air.org/sites/default/files/downloads/report/Humanitarian-Cash-Transfer-
DRC-April-2017.pdf 
The evaluation looks at UNICEF’s ARCC II Programme providing unconditional cash transfers to 
23,480 families in the eastern DRC. It was a humanitarian programme, but was partly evaluated 
on the criteria of resilience. A resilience index looking at food security, welfare, income sources, 
livestock holdings, saving and debt, school enrolment and access to health services, was used. 
Recipients faced many shocks including many armed groups, kidnapping, lack of access to 
fields, uncertainties, debt, weather, hosting IDPs, etc (p. 54). Cash meant they could meet the 
wide range of needs arising from a conflict situation. 
The evaluation found that households were able to increase their well-being and resilience, 
including increase food security and consumption, and better protective capacity and coping 
strategies such as increasing savings, school enrolment, agricultural activity and ownership of 
agricultural assets.  
While it helped meet household needs, most informants felt the resilience produced was limited: 
'the majority of informants demonstrated that although the transfers may have helped to 
overcome certain shocks, they did not create sustainable resilience for 
beneficiaries...although the transfers enabled some beneficiaries to overcome certain shocks 
and prepare for future ones, the most vulnerable beneficiaries still perceived their situation as 
precarious.' 
4. Asia 
Morais, N. & Ahmad, M. M. (2010). Sustaining livelihoods in complex emergencies: 
Experiences of Sri Lanka. Development in Practice, 20(1), 5–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520903436919 
The article analyses livelihoods programming in Tamil-held areas of Sri Lanka with respect to 
their impact on resilience. It focused on an Oxfam livelihoods project 'focused primarily on 
conflict-affected people in the non-tsunami areas.' It is based on interviews with 75 microfinance 
recipients. 
 
It found a 'positive association between cash provision and diversification into supportive 
income-earning activities. Cash benefits had enabled the target groups either to divert part of 
the earnings of their main activity to complementary options, or to increase the level of savings 
that they could invest in these options.'  It also pointed to the reactivation of social bonds, 
access to finance, and regaining access to land, as factors that helped returnees from 
displacement. Education and skills were also helpful in allowing returnees to recover. 
 
It recommended close attention to the strategies households used to adapt and recover. 
For instance, it found that many converted their loans in portable assets in the form of gold 
jewellery (which could be used as dowries or financial assets). This was a strategy in case of 
displacement and in anticipation of potential future disruptions.  
 
Noting that some loans failed, for example after the recipients tried to enter a new field of work, it 
suggested that 'understanding household circumstances, mapping context-specific constraints 
that could affect productive initiatives, finding causal pathways, and equipping local people with 
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knowledge about the risks involved in various livelihood activities would ensure better outcomes'. 
 
Recommendations on working with armed groups include understanding the dynamics of 
the groups' authority and its effect on citizens' resilience, and carefully seeking to avoid 
political co-option or controversy. In the Tamil-held area, NGOs worked under the direction of 
the authorities. They therefore had a strong network, but did not always have much expertise as 
many were former combatants. Moreover, taxation by the authorities made it harder for 
individuals and households to make a living. Adaptive strategies included selling goods to other 
households, keeping a low profile, restricting production to subsistence levels, and postponing 
expansion. 
 
The report suggests that attempts by foreign donors to attach conditions on their aid did not 
work. However, foreign NGOs found they could contribute because the Tamil NGOs were 'de-
linked from the functions of other political institutions of the rebels'. It recommended that foreign 
donors focus on building local NGO capacity, rather than attaching conditions on aid. 
 
Mena, R., & Hilhorst, D. (2020). The (im)possibilities of disaster risk reduction in the 
context of high-intensity conflict: the case of Afghanistan. Environmental Hazards, 
advance access, https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2020.1771250 
There are a small number of disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes in conflict situations. This 
article analyses the implementation of DRR in Afghanistan. 
Strategies used to overcome conflict risks and lessons were: 
 Conflict occurs on multiple levels. The article notes that macro effects of the conflict 
situation meant that NGOs only worked in government-controlled areas. Micro-level 
conflicts, on the other hand, took the form of disputes over resources, building, or job 
opportunities from the DRR. All resilience work in conflict settings needs conflict 
sensitivity, and to consider how interventions might exacerbate tensions or create 
conflict. 
 Many NGOs focused on building visible infrastructure rather than institutional 
development. This contradicts DRR best practice which also seeks to improve 
institutions, and came about because NGOs working from Kabul wanted visible evidence 
of their work. 
 NGOs were reliant on local staff with mediation skills. While these staff could provide 
understanding of local power balances and disputes, mediation nevertheless took time. 
 Most NGOs began undertaking conflict analysis on an ad hoc basis. However, some 
began to formalise this over time. One developed a conflict analysis manual and trained 
its staff. 
 NGOs mainly implemented DRR where they already worked, and appended it to other 
programmes. This meant they understood social and cultural context, and that they could 
deal with short funding cycles. It also meant that DRR programmes were not allocated 
based on need. 
 In interviews, all NGOs emphasised the need for programme flexibility and flexible 
funding. 
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 The programmes suggest that DRR can foster community collaboration. Communities 
appreciated the work. However, long-term impact is hard to measure, because many of 
the projects surveyed are small. For more impact, the authors suggest the need to link 
DRR to livelihoods and poverty reduction in more integrated programming. 
5. Middle East 
Kaya, Z. N. (2018). Resilience policy and internally displaced women in Iraq: an 
unintentionally flawed approach. LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security Working 
Paper Series (3/2018). London: Centre for Women, Peace & Security. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87156/1/wps13Kaya.pdf 
This policy brief analyses the resilience framing of programmes for displaced women in Iraq. It 
considers the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 2016-2017 for Iraq, UNDP’s Iraq 
Crisis Response and Resilience Programme 2014-2017 and UN Women’s LEAP Programme in 
Iraq. It also refers to interviews with Iraqi women. 
 
It argues that in this case, resilience framing places emphasis too heavily on the community as a 
source of resilience (at the expense of ignoring national institutions). Resilience framing identifies 
cultural norms and economic factors as vulnerabilities, but does not always understand the form 
these take in context. 'Cultural factors' are sometimes posited as a reason for vulnerability that 
could be better described in terms of law and policy. 
 
By contrast, the author argues that institutional and practical regulation have a big role in shaping 
vulnerabilities (e.g. IDPs need to register at Ministry of Migration, and women are often 
registered under their husband's names). Programmers therefore 'need to carefully consider 
limitations and assumptions inherent in the resilience policy framework when operationalising it 
on the ground'. The author recommends an emphasis on institutions and state capacity and 
responsibility in order to avoid shifting too much of the burden to communities. She also 
recommends using perceptions assessments to inform understandings of vulnerability. 
 
Shah, R. (2015). Protecting children in a situation of ongoing conflict: Is resilience 
sufficient as the end product? International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 14, 
179–185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2015.06.003 
The article looks at two single-sector programmes to improve the psychological resilience of 
Palestinian children following Israeli attacks. They are CARE's Eye to the Future programme 
(psychosocial support) and the NRC-supported Better Learning Programme (BLP), psycho-
educational intervention. They worked with teachers and counsellors to help the children 
understand their fears and to create supportive classroom environments. It notes that both 
programmes helped the children be resilient to past shocks, i.e. it led to clear improvements in 
PTSD symptoms and reductions in anti-social behaviour among the children. They also 
strengthened the capacity of local community based organisations (CBOs) and parents involved 
in the implementation. However, the author questions the focus on the resilience of children, 
given the continued violence in the area makes it impossible for the resilience to be sustainable. 
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Oxfam. (2016). From the Ground Up: Gender and Conflict. Report. Oxford: Oxfam. 
https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620112/rr-yemen-
gender-conflict-analysis-201016-en.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
The report provides an analysis of gender-based impacts of the conflict in Yemen, as well as 
women's coping mechanisms and resilience. It was based on a secondary data review and 
information from 544 households across Yemen, including household interviews, focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews with or ‘key informants’, and case studies/stories.  
It finds that: 
 There are barriers to livelihoods as a result of the war. There are examples of both 
positive and negative coping strategies including street selling, help from neighbours, 
child labour and eating less food. The use of curfews and security risks, alongside 
cultural beliefs and cost of transport, means there are restrictions on men's and women's 
freedom of movement. There is increased danger collecting water or grazing livestock 
 'Female-headed households are generally more at risk of food insecurity, due to the fact 
that there are few work opportunities for women. Women are generally excluded from 
economic transactions in the local markets. Respondents identified the most vulnerable 
groups as the marginalized groups (‘Muhamasheen’), women who are disabled, widows, 
divorcees, prisoners and wives of prisoners, wives whose migrant-worker husbands fail 
to send remittances, female refugees, youth and elderly women.' 
 Household responses to shocks are gendered. There is household conflict if men lost 
their jobs and women become more important in earning income. Most men share their 
income with the family, whereas only some women share all of their income with the 
family. This may be to motivate men to get a job, or a belief that women are good at 
conserving household resources. 
 There is some evidence that conflict has reduced the impact of restrictive cultural norms 
and traditions around women’s participation in community life and employment;  
 Increases in marriage and an increase in polygamy have been reported as coping 
strategies. There is increased pregnancy due to more men out of work and lack of 
contraceptives or family planning, as well as the belief that more children will help Yemen 
recover. 
 There have been reductions in the coverage of Yemen's social welfare fund and citizens 
have limited access to financial services. The resources of indigenous women’s saving 
groups (Hakbah) are reported to be insufficient to meet the demands brought by the 
conflict.  
 Some door-to-door sellers have had to stop because of a lack of credit to buy food. 
Social guarantees (i.e. credit given to introduced customers) are a common way for 
Yemenis to buy on credit. 
 The role of formal government in providing services has declined while the 'the perceived 
importance of informal protection service providers increased'. There has been a 
reductions in health services and difficulties accessing them. Access to these is 
gendered, and women usually access tribal leaders via their wives. 
 There is a lack of women's involvement in decision-making structures, and an increasing 
use of informal structures (e.g. tribal or armed groups). Women often involved in aid 
programmes and communities committees. 
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 Women and girls are particularly at risk of violence. 
The report makes recommendations to inform humanitarian programming based on these 
findings: 
 Gender-responsive initiatives to support the resilience of men and women in Yemen 
should build on existing capacities at community and household levels, including local 
conflict- mitigation schemes. 
 Community-based and community-level preparedness structures should be supported to 
build communities’ resilience to shocks and conflict, through participatory planning, 
mitigation, and assessment of available resources (including alternative shelter, water 
resources, financial resources, or community contingency plans) with an explicit inclusive 
approach to ensure the participation of female IDPs, marginalised groups and wage 
labourers.  
 The outreach capacity of community-level networks and stakeholders need to be 
strengthened, especially women’s groups, community development groups and women’s 
saving groups.  
 Notwithstanding the need to increase engagement with women-led local NGOs, new 
gender- responsive strategies should include (more) males in community mobilisation 
efforts, in recognition of their significant control over household resources and practices.  
 Newly established committees should have, whenever possible, a membership of 50% 
women and 50% men, and equal numbers of women and men in leadership positions. 
 At household level, gender-sensitive response initiatives can build on the growing role of 
women in income generation and their resulting increasing role in household decision-
making. Building on that, family-based income-generation projects can be further 
developed, preferably run by local community organisations that have been supported 
through training and capacity building.   
 Efforts to increase women’s participation in community decision-making should be rooted 
in strong, inclusive and participatory local gender and power analyses. Every community 
has different dynamics; for example, in some communities, local councils have high 
acceptance and play an active role, while in others the tribal leaders have more say, etc.  
 While promoting women’s access to livelihoods is critical, organizations should also 
ensure that men and youth have adequate access to livelihoods activities. There are 
opportunities to work with men to diversify their skills and livelihoods activities as a way 
of building resilience.  
 Programmes aimed at improving women’s access to livelihoods should address the wide 
range of mobility issues women face, particularly in rural areas and areas controlled by 
armed groups.  
 The reactivation and improvement of Social Welfare Fund programmes should be 
advocated, including a review of beneficiary lists and benefits. In light of current 
deficiencies in the lists, international organizations should use participatory approaches 
to identify and target the poorest households.  
 Small-scale producers should be supported to improve marketing of their produce to be 
better able to compete with imported goods in agricultural markets.  
34 
 Efforts to improve access to medical services should focus on increasing the number of 
female medical staff, the availability of maternal and child healthcare, and the affordability 
of healthcare.  
 There needs to be development and improved availability of vocational training and 
education that would enable both literate and illiterate youth to gain access to immediate 
livelihood opportunities. Work to ensure that any trainings offered reflect the current 
aspirations and preferred learning styles of youth.  
 Interventions for small-scale electrification projects (‘off the grid’ systems) should be 
piloted at community and household levels to provide households with alternative energy 
sources, including exploring ways to support existing women-led initiatives using solar 
power.  
 The availability of mobile phone networks and internet connectivity could be a favourable 
entry point for targeted interventions to empower women, including the promotion of 
social media as a tool to introduce better coping mechanisms, early warning, availability 
of aid and more. 
 Male and female participants in focus group discussions requested more initiatives to 
support income-generating opportunities, especially for IDP women and host 
communities, including: a) inputs to support home-based work and training, b) special 
provision to help women with their care-giving responsibilities, c) support to vulnerable 
people who are not able to participate in such activities, and d) activities to prevent the 
recruitment of minors by armed groups. 
 The interviewed male and female populations also emphasised the importance of being 
always consulted by relief providers in the design and implementation of humanitarian 
interventions, in order for their views to be taken into account. Concerns included the 
whole range of access to information about available aid, registration, targeting, 
distribution, and the availability of complaint mechanisms.  
 When providing non-food item support, agencies should respect ‘do no harm’ principles. 
The provision of gas stoves might support some families, while it imposes economic 
pressure on others who are forced to buy expensive gas bottles instead of using their 
limited resources for other purposes. Wood stoves also increase the risk of fire, 
especially for IDP families living in improvised shelters and tents. 
 The specific needs of polygamous households should be addressed when it comes to 
providing food, non-food items, hygiene kit distribution and shelter assistance, ensuring 
all the wives and their children have the same access to humanitarian resources.  
 When making cash transfers conditional on girls’ access to education, agencies should 
ensure that the ‘do no harm’ principle is respected. While it is good to create an increase 
in the number of girls going to school, households are sometimes putting their girls at risk 
while significantly increasing pressure on mothers, in order to qualify for cash transfers 
Singh, N., Brandolini, G. V. (2019). Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen Joint 
Programme. Evaluation. ERRY JP. 
https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/14980 
The Enhancing Rural Resilience in Yemen (ERRY) programme. It aimed to enhanced resilience 
through support to rehabilitation of community infrastructure; livelihoods stabilisation and 
recovery; social cohesion and local governance; and improved access to sustainable energy. It 
offered seven types of intervention: cash for work and assets; crops and livestock value chains; 
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microbusinesses; solar energy, social cohesion, local governance and skills development. It ran 
from 2016 to 2019, was funded by the EU and run by UNDP, FAO, ILO and WFP. 
The programme sought to work with individuals, communities and local government. As well as 
livelihoods interventions, training was offered, infrastructure improved and efforts were made to 
improve social cohesion at the local level. For example, agricultural activities were 'framed along 
a value chain approach', including both help to individual producers and communities in 
managing public goods such as water or markets. 213 communities developed resilience plans 
through village cooperative councils (VCCs) 
The evaluation found that ERRY had been successful in improving resilience: 
 There were improvement in household incomes and food security. Technical and 
financial support to microbusinesses helped diversify household incomes. Training of 
farmers and distribution of seeds and tools increased yields. 
 It helped with livelihoods viability restoration of capital assets, through the cash for work 
programme and other interventions. For example, the 'installation of photovoltaic solar 
systems allowed the recovery and expansion of health and education services and of 
livelihoods in agriculture, food processing, clothing production'. 
 It helped with the mitigation of local conflicts. The 'Insider Mediators' trained by the 
programme have helped solve local conflicts, such as those around water. 
 Some increase in capacities to recover from shocks and stresses was recorded. 
The evaluation was published in 2019, and so cannot judge the longer-term impact of the 
programmes. However, it states that all but the temporary humanitarian programme (cash for 
work and assets) showed signs of sustainability. The rehabilitated assets were being used by the 
communities (pp. 70-1).  
The reach of the programme was limited by the conflict situation. The evaluation found that 'the 
institutional and macro-economic instability limits the synergies inside and outside the 
programme with other initiatives to consolidate and expand resilience.' Reinforcing the capacity 
of local service providers and the institutional framework would help in this respect.  
The evaluation also found that co-ordination with other humanitarian organisations was 
burdensome and delayed programmes. It recommends that partners find ways to better co-
ordinate among themselves to better ensure multi-dimensional resilience. 
Individual components were linked to strengthening the capacity of local authorities. This has 
been limited by insecurity, the poor macro-economic conditions, and limited co-ordination of the 
different programme elements. 
Ward, S. and Qatinah, A. (2019). The gendered dimension of multi-purpose cash 
supporting disaster resilience. Early learning on the impacts of multi-purpose cash 
transfers and community support projects on household and community resilience 
building, Amran and Abyan Governorates, Yemen. Care and Action Contre La Faim. 
http://www.cashlearning.org/resources/library/1384-the-gendered-dimension-of-multi-
purposecash-supporting-
disasterresilience?keywords=gendered+dimension+of+multi&searched=1&pSection=r
esources&pTitle=library 
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The report evaluates a cash transfer programme and community asset rehabilitation and skill 
building programing in the governorates of Abyan and Amran in Yemen from 2017 using 
quantative measures of food consumption, savings and other aspects of household resilience, 
and interviews. It offered cash transfers and 69 community support projects. It was funded by the 
EU and run by CARE Yemen and Action contra la faim. 
Effects and lessons included: 
 The programme led to significant reductions in 'negative coping behaviour' and increases 
in food consumption. It allowed the recipients to repay debt and be less reliant on 
neighbours, as well as make investments in livestock or save money. Recipients were 
able to diversify their incomes to some degree.  
 Consistency of income streams allows recipients to plan better. The evaluation warns 
that households investing in resources for longer-term survival (e.g. debt repayment, new 
livestock) should not be taken as a sign that they have gone beyond needing help with 
basic needs, and may only be investing because they are receiving basic needs support. 
The evaluation found there was no linear progress in household resilience, as shocks in 
this context could return. 
 The programme helped markets grow and other signs of community resilience, but there 
were signs that this declined after the transfers stopped, probably because of the 
extreme needs in the country. 
 Women were not targeted, and were later found to be investing in livelihoods or skills 
training. Barriers remained for people with disabilities and old people. In targeting to help 
the vulnerable, the report recommends distinguishing between vulnerable people who will 
need significant continued support (extreme age, illness, or infirmity), and those more 
likely to be able to overcome their vulnerability in the short to medium term. 
 The projects inclusive planning discussions were reported to have increased community 
cohesion, but not planning or risk management. However, in surveys households often 
did not cite infrastructure rehabilitation projects as helpful to their livelihoods (even if 
these projects addressed issues such as water scarcity that they had raised in discussion 
with the NGOs). The most commonly cited projects were those more directly linked to 
households (savings groups, market access roads, money to invest in livestock and 
agricultural inputs). The evaluation suggests that this may be a 'perception problem', and 
the respondents may simply not have connected the projects to their households. 
 Qualitative surveys indicate that voluntary savings and loan associations were seen as 
helpful. Few respondents reported skills training as helpful for livelihoods. 
 Respondents to the surveys emphasised existing support networks within the community. 
Al-Ahmadi, A. A., & de Silva, S. (2018). Delivering Social Protection in the Midst of 
Conflict and Crisis: The Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project. World Bank. 
https://doi.org/10.1596/30608 
The Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (ECRP) has sought to continue the World 
Bank's development objectives through the conflict. It aims to preserve Yemen's human and 
social capital, to help with recovery and rehabilitation. It has engaged with public institutions, 
namely the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Public Works Project (PWP). It 
builds on the design and experience of a pre-existing national system of cash transfers, and 
engages local private sector service providers. 
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The feasibility of the project was dependent on the World Bank's willingness to use an 
'exceptional' approach to engage with a conflict country and adjust its funding mechanisms to do 
so. It was also helped by the existing capacity and delivery systems in Yemen. The report also 
emphasises the programme's ability to show that it is a non-political force in the conflict, and to 
enact this through programming decisions (e.g. beneficiary selection). 
As well as immediate income relief, the ECRP includes longer-term resilience programmes: 
 enhancing Yemen’s social protection delivery system;  
 extending  access to basic services (roads, water, health, education, irrigation, etc.);  
 supporting families by investing in their children’s health and education;  
 assisting youth in acquiring skills;  
 promoting entrepreneurship;  
 building social capital (through village development councils, community self-help groups, 
and local councils);  
 preserving the capacity of Yemen’s critical social protection institutions 
 building the capacity of youth advocates. 
Emerging lessons include: 
 Engaging with Yemen’s pre-existing capacity and delivery systems (the social welfare 
fund and public works programme) helped emergency response, and improvement of 
resilience (p. 23)  
 'A transparent targeting strategy ensures political neutrality and increases buy-in by 
diverse – and often opposing – political actors' (p. 24). it uses a distress index to target 
beneficiaries. It uses participatory process to adjust its targeting (for example, it was 
refined to overcome concerns that areas without IDPs were not being targeted enough). 
The method 'has allowed ECRP to be seen by all parties as a politically neutral 
programme'. 
 Inclusive targeting helped social cohesion by being sensitive to the needs of different 
groups. Some programmes also link different communities - such as hosts and IDPs - 
through a shared development goal. Different groups were allowed equal opportunities to 
participate, and respondents to surveys approved of the beneficiary selection process. 
 Remote and third party monitoring helped overcoming the security challenges of 
gathering data. The programme also trained community members to provide feedback 
using phones and the internet.  
 Local partner institutions are used to both gain acceptance of the programme and to 
create a better understanding of local political and social dynamics. They can reassure 
authorities, on either side of the conflict, that the programmes are non-political. They can 
also help the programme be aware of potential conflicts or tensions, and to tailor 
communications so as not to cause or worsen conflicts. 
 In this case, one of the implementing agencies, the SFD enjoyed a large degree of 
organisational autonomy from central government. It was thus able to make agreements 
with NGOs, or respond on the ground, without reference to central government. 
 Donors to the SFD have 'clearly communicated' to the conflict parties that they are 
neutral and are not willing to compromise this. 
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 External donors have continued to fund the SFD, meaning that the capacity can be 
maintained. This have maintained their staff, and will be able to help recovery and 
reconstruction after the conflict. 
 Coordination of efforts by different agencies has been useful. It has been supported by 
the World Bank in particular, which had strong links with Yemeni institutions. 
 An adaptive design was important in allowing ECRP to adapt to problems brought by the 
conflict, or other shocks. Adaptations in response to the war include generated conflict-
related data and conflict analysis to target beneficiaries instead of household surveys; 
switching from field monitoring to remote and third-party monitoring; and switching to 
mobile money or delivery by commercial banks instead of manual transactions. 
 The interventions were 'tightly linked' to other sectors such as health, education and 
water. This multi-sector approach allowed ECRP to consider how social protection 
could identify and help at-risk households and their lack of money or behavioural 
challenges, while health programmes could help provide health services for these 
households. 
 A risk mitigation framework was built into the design of the project, and risks have been 
monitored throughout.  
6. Syria 
Ismail, R., Nasser, R., Marzouk, N., Mehchy  and Z., Rustom  , A., (2019). Food 
security and conflict in Syria. Report. Syrian Centre for Policy Research. 
https://www.scpr-syria.org/launch-of-food-security-conflict-in-syria-report/ 
The report is an econometric analysis of food security in Syria. It does not provide evidence on 
programming impact directly, but can indirectly be used to address feasibility through its 
identification of causes of lack of food security and recommendations for policy makers and the 
international community. 
The food security index fell significantly during the war. Declines in production occurred due to 
loss of manpower, targeting of opposing parties' food supplies, the centralisation of food by the 
warring parties, siege strategies. This led to increased dependence on imports and aid 
The report also identified the decline of social capital, and activities such as smuggling, theft, 
royalties, looting and participation in fighting as associated with deteriorating food security. 
Its broad policy recommendations include, at the national level, the need to stop violence and 
authoritarian institutions and build the productive economy.  
Broad recommendations more relevant to humanitarian actors identify the areas most needed to 
improve food security, although many are based on a cessation of conflict and the ability to 
reconstruct and rebuild. They include: 
 To remedy the damage to natural resources from waste and pollution from the war;  
 Involve civil society;  
 Target the most affected groups through development;  
 Look to help community reconciliation and trust building. 
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 Rehabilitate irrigation systems, dams, groundwater and artesian wells that supply 
irrigated land with water needs, provide raw materials for pumping water such as 
electricity and fuel,.  
 Provide seeds, fertilisers and food for agricultural producers and rehabilitation of 
wetlands and livestock sheds destroyed during the war, as well as loans to buy inputs 
and price stabilisation. 
 Work to form local teams from the public and private sector and civil society to follow up 
the implementation of reconstruction plans and rehabilitation at the local level. Help local 
committees work with state institutions, to expand their administrative competence and 
therefore independence. 
 Provide employment opportunities for citizens as a priority in the areas where the 
displaced need to return and resettle.  
 Ensure the availability of essential foodstuffs in the local market at appropriate prices, 
raise the value of wages so as to take into account the required food basket, provide job 
opportunities to reduce unemployment, develop social security programmes for families 
that lost their breadwinners and support the disabled.  
 Provide an appropriate environment for increase women’s participation in work. 
 Increase the role of consumer protection organisations to ensure the quality of food and 
to put an end to monopolisation, which contributed to the distribution of low-quality 
products at high prices. 
 Provide petrol products, including cooking gas to all regions at reasonable prices, control 
of sales by local brokers and the development of deterrent penalties for violations related 
to distribution and prices on the black market.  
Rizkallah, A., Gengler, J., Reedy, K., & Carpenter, A. (2019). Countering Sectarianism 
in the Middle East. Santa Monica: Rand Corportion. https://doi.org/10.7249/rr2799 
This book analyses the factors that encourage resilience to sectarianism in Lebanon, Bahrain, 
Syria and Iraq. It focuses more on factors already existing in these societies than on donor 
programming, but lessons can be drawn from the analysis for donor programming. 
The books argues that the following common factors allow societies to be resilient to 
sectarianism: political and social mechanisms for mediating among sectarian communities, the 
nature of the physical environment, and the proximity and access of outside forces that might 
have an interest in instrumentalising sectarian identity. 
It argues that 'communities with higher levels of existing cross-sectarian interaction can further 
boost resilience, even in the face of sectarian-driven armed conflict, as occurred during the 
height of the civil war in Iraq' and points to neighbourhoods with areas where different 
communities can mix. It also suggests that 'less pronounced socioeconomic gaps improve a 
community’s ability to resist sectarianism.' 
It emphasises the importance of civil society at the local level, governance reform, promotion of 
local media, and urban planning to increase interactions between communities as ways to 
increase resilience to sectarianism. Support for civil society should take the form of fostering free 
media and association rather than supporting specific groups. 
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It also suggests that border management can help by preventing the influx of foreign support for 
sectarian or extremist groups (such as that provided by Turkey and Qatar in Syria). It notes that 
political elites can help or hinder sectarianism. 
Carpenter's chapter on Iraq considers, amongst other things, the role of formal conflict resolution 
provided by Mercy Corps, who trained the 'Network of Iraqi Facilitators (NIF), Dohuk University 
and the Interfaith Dialogue programme (p. 107). She argues that while resilience in Baghdad 
depended on local actors, resilience in Dohuk relied much more on international actors who 
mitigated the humanitarian crisis, created jobs, and mediated tensions between local and 
national government. 
DFAT. (2019). Independent Evaluation of the Syria Crisis Humanitarian and Resilience 
Package. Canberra: DFAT. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/syria-crisis-
humanitarian-resilience-package-evaluation-report.pdf 
This brief report on evaluated Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (DFAT)'s Syria 
response, including resilience. It found 'mixed results with resilience-building activities. While 
education programs achieved good outcomes, a more contextually- grounded approach to 
livelihoods programming is required to realise maximum impact as well as greater integration 
between humanitarian and resilience-building activities'. This was attributed to the lack of 
strategic focus on resilience in the programming, in favour of immediate humanitarian 
programmes.  
It recommends that in future work in Syria, DFAT should 'build on knowledge gained and work to 
date by continuing to focus on education and livelihoods without expanding into any new sectors. 
Support for livelihoods should be more strategic, built on a nuanced understanding of context 
and partners, and include clearly articulated intended outcomes.' 
Douedari, Y., & Howard, N. (2019). Perspectives on rebuilding health system 
governance in opposition-controlled Syria: A qualitative study. International Journal 
of Health Policy and Management, 8(4), 233–244. 
https://doi.org/10.15171/ijhpm.2018.132 
The article explores the challenges to maintaining health systems in areas controlled by the Free 
Syrian Army through interviews with staff from the health systems, NGOs, donors and service 
users. It analyses the civilian governance in opposition-controlled areas, and the establishment 
of Health Directorates (HDs) in 2014. These are subject to shelling and lack of funding, among 
other issues. 
Its interviews revealed a number of issues about health systems governance, which can help 
build better resilience in the system. It was found that HD leaders had some strategic plans to 
rebuild but in practice had to focus on maintaining basic services; and service users were 
positive about health services given the constraints of the war, among other things (p. 236). The 
HDs therefore demonstrated 'grassroots governance' and a form of resilience (p. 241).  
Interviewees reported that NGOs had no positive role in supporting health system governance. 
They did not co-ordinate project planning with local authorities sufficiently, and thus contributed 
to fragmentation. Armed groups were not reported to be interfering with health systems (p. 241). 
The main challenges identified were: 
 Security (e.g., targeting of health facilities and personnel by the Syrian regime) 
41 
 Uneven funding (because opposition HDs were not recognised, they could not always 
receive funding from UN agencies; while NGOs could often fund health projects, but not 
governance). Currently ad hoc methods are used by HDs, such as collecting fees, finding 
staff part-time jobs. 
 Capacity (loss of experienced governance professionals and health workers) 
The interviewees' suggested solutions were: 
 Supporting HDs through new funding mechanisms, supporting governance, and 
recognising HDs as the health authorities in their area. 
 Addressing health-worker loss, with possible methods including higher salaries, salaries 
for currently unpaid jobs, and more training to compensate for losses. 
 Improving coordination to overcome fragmentation 
The article's recommendations to international donors are: 
 Political recognition of local health authorities is necessary if initial grassroots 
governance initiatives are to succeed.  
 Financial and technical support of local health authorities is urgently needed if they are to 
survive.  
 To protect fragile health system governance initiatives, the international community must 
do more to end bombings of health facilities and health-workers in opposition-controlled 
areas. 
Care. (2020). Understanding resilience: perspectives from Syrians. London: CARE. 
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/understanding-resilience-perspectives-
syrians 
The research sought to understand Syrians' perceptions of the shocks affecting them, and the 
strategies and resources they use to deal with them. It is based on ethnographic research and 
interviews with 328 participants in opposition-controlled areas: Idleb, Al Hassakeh, Raqqa, 
Aleppo and one host community in Jordan. 96% of the participants were displaced, and the 
majority were women. The research seeks to capture participants' changing circumstances over 
time (e.g. multiple displacements) to understand resilience as a process. It is structured around 
CARE's typology of resilience capacities: anticipatory, absorptive, adaptive and transformative. It 
focuses on social capital, as this was identified as a key source of resilience in the context. 
The research found that displacement (74%), exposure to a conflict event (69%), economic 
struggle (69%) were the most common shocks and stressors, followed by immediate loss, acute 
health issues, experience of trauma or destruction of home (p. 28). Most reported receiving 
warnings via formal or informal sources. It was hard to gauge the reliability of the information, or 
how to respond based on it. Official warnings were more consistent and reliable in rural or camp 
areas than urban areas. Young people were seen as good sources of warnings due to mobility 
and access to the internet. 
Respondents’ preparation improved over time. Techniques included: planning best location to 
flee to, identifying safest and fasted routes out of town, having well-established communication 
channels, stocking food / securing residence for a long-term stay without leaving and having 
access to cash or other objects that could be liquefied easily. These techniques were constantly 
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adapted as circumstances changed. However, many people's savings and income declined over 
time, making it hard to prepare.  
Given the ongoing conflict, resilience was mainly anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive. Syrians 
remained extremely vulnerable to shocks. A number of resilience strategies, at the individual and 
community level, were reported. However, 'most people’s recovery is incredibly fragile, and 
individuals and households remain worried about basic survival even with seemingly resilient 
factors present.' The resilience capacities used can often only ensure basic survival, and Syrians 
are vulnerable to the repeated shocks they face. 
Social capital was key to resilience strategies, as many sought loans, advice or other support 
within their communities. It found that communities often stayed together or fled together and 
provided support for each other. When people fled, they often had to rely on aid, especially if 
they fled somewhere without family or friends. In camps this was more forthcoming, whereas in 
urban areas they had to seek it out. Levels of aid support were seen as unreliable. Communities 
provided vital social and emotional support, and collective decision-making. The psychological 
effects of displacement and loss varied. Richer individuals, for example, may have felt worse at 
having lost more money.  
Livelihoods strategies included men and women taking second jobs (or women working outside 
the home). Some were able to look to build a longer-term livelihood, although this was not always 
possible. Many respondents were keen on them or their children continuing education. While 
there were many barriers, many improvising through home schooling/individual study or 
community-run schools. Skills training and capital were seen as needed to improve livelihoods. 
While women often took on extra work, and even felt empowered in some cases, there were also 
reports of restrictions on movement, and crime, in cities such as Raqqa. Early marriage was also 
seen in rural areas. There was mixed evidence on whether Syrians would like women's 
increased role to continue after the war.  
Social capital was strong within groups, but inter-group tensions may have been worsened by the 
war. Pre-war communities may also be less cohesive because of deaths, trauma, destruction 
and displacement. This may make it harder to rebuild after the war, given the importance of 
social bonds in Syria. 
Low levels of trust in local and national government were reported. Views of NGOs were often 
negative, particularly in urban areas. 
Resilience programming should: 
 Be 'multi-sector and holistic, in order to address both the impact of an individual shock 
itself, as well as to build and/or support the capacities of beneficiaries to better withstand 
such a shock (or others) in the future.' 
 Identify and work with resilience capacities embedded at the individual, household, and 
community level, and connect these to governance systems for sustainable recovery. 
 'Programmes must be flexible and nimble in order to deliver aid that is relevant and 
effective in a manner that is timely and efficient, and tailored to different people’s needs.' 
This includes 'quick, absorptive humanitarian interventions' to deal with shocks. 
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 Should support interventions fostering long-term livelihoods opportunities, with 
appropriate linkages between, for example, training and employment opportunities or 
finance. 
 Support education, in person or via long-distance methods, scholarships, transportation 
to exams, or other methods. 
 Support women's opportunities, and involve women and men in dialogues about 
women's increasing role. 
 Work with community structures and social networks, including IDPs and marginalised 
groups, to identify needs and proposed solutions. Then facilitate dialogue between 
communities and governance structures. 
 Seek to regain trust with Syrians, partly by improving communications and being more 
consistent with assistance. 
 Provide psycho-social support to all sectors of society. 
 Support IDPs, those in beseiged areas, people with disabilities, and other hard to reach 
groups. 
Stein, J. (2020, forthcoming). Building a more resilient economy: exploring the 
strategies used by Syrians. Syria Resilience Consortium.  
Assessment of Syrians' resilience strategies with a view to leveraging them in resilience 
programming. It focused on loss of livelihood, loss of purchasing power, interruption of education, 
displacement, disruption of social networks and discrimination.  
It was undertaken by the Syria Resilience consortium, comprising CARE, the Danish Refugee 
Council (DRC), Humanity and Inclusion (HI), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Mercy 
Corps and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). 
The report uses previous research from consortium members (transcripts from interviews ad 
focus groups), as well as 24 interviews with NGO staff. A disproportionate number of the 
interviews were in Kurdish-controlled territories, and there is little evidence on vulnerable groups' 
resilience strategies. The report does not use any data from interviews conducted in areas that 
have changed hands since they were conducted, although future changes in the political and 
economic situation may make the information less useful.   
It documents the high levels of disruptions to livelihoods, markets and education. Two thirds of 
households have lost one or more of their main income sources since the start of the crisis. The 
centrally planned agriculture system that existed before the conflict has been ended, meaning 
farmers have had to switch quickly to a market system and value chains have collapsed. 
It classifies responses into positive and negative coping strategies. Negative coping strategies 
are defined as behaviour or strategies that: increase the risk that certain groups will be exposed 
to harms such as conscription, kidnapping, and conflict; are detrimental to household and/or 
individual resources; exacerbate existing inequalities between groups; compromise household 
and/or individual socio-economic well-being (including health); harm the environment; seek to 
deliberately avoid mainstream systems and institutions, thereby reinforcing less efficient parallel 
systems or structures within Syria. 
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Table 1: Positive and negative coping strategies 
Community type Positive coping strategies Negative coping strategies 
Rural  Decreased cultivation of crops 
that require irrigation 
Reduced dependence on the 
use of chemical fertilisers and 
herbicides 
IDPs and women provide 
more casual labour to farms 
Use of grain for household 
consumption or replanting  
Preference for small 
ruminants over cattle 
Small-scale household 
production of vegetables 
(primarily in North East Syria) 
Export of livestock by large 
breeders (primarily in North 
East Syria) 
Cessation or reduction in 
cultivation 
Land rental and profit-sharing 
agreements between smallholder 
farmers and more prosperous 
farmers (that disadvantage 
smallholders) 
Reduction in the size of livestock 
holdings 
Urban Start-up of small and medium 
sized enterprises (especially 
by women)  
Relocation of existing small 
businesses to areas that are 
more secure  
Teaching and tutoring 
(especially by women)  
Employment with INGOs, 
NGOs and UN 
Employment with the Kurdish 
self-administration (primarily in 
North East Syria) 
Working multiple jobs or doing 
casual labour alongside a full-time 
job  
Facilitation of civil documentation  
Remaining on Syrian government 
payrolls 
Rural and urban Diversifying income sources  
Use of family and community 
social networks for support  
Creation of new social 
networks by IDPs (especially 
women) with host community 
members  
Relocation to communities 
where economic opportunities 
are perceived to be greater  
Use of informal loans from 
friends and family 
Use of in-kind loans from traders  
Emigration and dependence on 
remittances 
Sale of humanitarian aid 
Sale of household assets  
Polygamy  
Early marriage and survival sex  
Joining an armed group, theft and 
smuggling 
Source: Reproduced with kind permission from Stein (2020, pp. 8-9) 
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Table 2: Positive and negative coping strategies on education 
Positive coping strategies Negative coping strategies 
Use of alternative class schedules and 
locations 
Parent-teacher collaboration to support 
home-based learning 
Tutoring and self-instruction 
Part-time attendance at school 
Travel time for educational activities (primarily in North East 
Syria) 
Enrolment at schools using Syrian government curriculum 
(primarily in North East Syria) 
Source: Reproduced with kind permission from Stein (2020, p. 10) 
It suggests the following approaches for consortium members undertaking resilience 
programming: 
 Recognise the importance of social relations in enabling access to credit and job 
opportunities in Syria. The war has narrowed social networks and many are reliant on 
their immediate family. It therefore argues that programming should support social 
relations between groups and help to expand social networks. It suggests that activities 
should be planned to bring together diverse groups. 
 It notes the adaptations farmers have made after not being able to afford certain inputs, 
such as chemical fertilisers. It suggests that this is an opportunity to help implement more 
environmentally friendly farming practices 
 It points to reports of a better business environment in north eastern Syria and suggests 
programming can help by 'supporting the start-up and expansion of businesses in north 
eastern Syria that produce goods which were previously sourced from western Syria, and 
by training business owners and entrepreneurs in financial planning and management, 
risk assessment and mitigation' 
 Supporting women to adapt to changing food systems in response to the war - more 
household vegetable, poultry and small ruminant production. 
 Taking into account the time women spend looking after children at home, which has 
increased because of the war. Programming should consider supporting this. 
 Programming should consider that the high cost of fuel makes it hard for some, including 
vulnerable groups, to travel to work. It should consider subsidising transport or other 
solutions to help. 
 Help mitigate the dangerous effects of cheap cooking, heating and lighting fuel sources 
currently being used with ventilation or other solutions. 
 Use online payments or cash transfers to help increase purchasing power as much as 
possible. 
 Help support informal teaching and learning systems such as home teaching or tutoring 
as a source of income, by teaching parents mentoring skills, or developing tutors' 
teaching skills. 
 Help children secure lost educational documents (proof of enrolment, certificates, etc.) 
 Consider that many children are working and going to school part-time. Classes outside 
of working hours can help these children. 
 Help schools manage classes that include older pupils. 
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 Provide supplements to salaries in schools where they are lower, to overcome disparities 
between Kurdish-, government- or NGO-funded schools.  
 Help children returning from aboard re-integrate into Syrian schools (or schools in the 
Kurdish-run area, where instruction is in Kurdish) 
 Help engage in risk education around the explosive remnants of war (ERW) that may be 
found around schools. 
Howe, K., Krystalli, R., Krishnan, V., Kurtz, J., & Macaranas, R. (2018). The Wages of 
War: Learning from how Syrians have adapted their livelihoods through seven years 
of conflict. Washington, DC: Mercy Corps. 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/RD_SyriaReport_dl_0118_FINAL-A4-
web.pdf 
Surveys of 1,168 randomly selected households in 124 communities, 350 purposively chosen 
(those who has started a new livelihood in the last 12 months) community key informants in 115 
communities, 46 young people in three regions and 36 key informants in local governance, 
business, humanitarian action, or health and education, were used to understand resilience 
strategies. Informants were asked about food security, expenditure, savings, hunger, well-being, 
their housing, and the following enabling factors for resilience were considered: market 
functioning, access to capital, social capital and networks, humanitarian aid received, and 
livelihood dynamics. 
It found that the following factors were enabling Syrians to adapt livelihoods and improve welfare: 
 Functioning markets 
 Access to loans and capital (usually from friends, relatives or local businesses) 
 Social networks help Syrians to find jobs, and are associated with better food security, 
higher expenditure and better housing. 
 Women and youth earning money report better self-esteem and self-reliance, and other 
welfare outcomes. However, working youth spend less time in education and women 
have increased overall their workloads as they usually have to still do the housework. 
Vulnerable men may be losing out. 
 Cash assistance is reported as the most favoured form, followed by livelihood 
programmes and some types of skills training. 
It therefore recommends NGOs and others should focus on supporting these factors. In addition, 
it suggests supporting small-scale producers' ability to produce food, to help local markets; 
identifying in-demand skills to provide training in; ensuring that humanitarian aid is not divisive, 
strengthens social networks, and builds on pre-existing skills as well as vulnerability; include men 
in livelihoods programmes; support a wider role for women and youth with caution, and seek to 
engage conservative leaders when overturning cultural norms; support technology-based skills 
development; combine 'emergency' and 'recovery' funds; look for systems-wide interventions 
where possible. 
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